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PLEADING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS*
THOMAS E. ATKINSON
One approach to pleading problems is by a thorough examina-
tion of the methods of handling a single topic such as the
statute of limitations, payment or contributory negligence. While
conclusions as to one of these may not be conclusive, the results
may be suggestive as to procedure generally. With reference to
time limitations, as with most other matters, litigants may differ
as to the facts, or as to the rules of law, or possibly both. One
immediately thinks of two points of possible difference as to the
facts, viz., the time when the action accrued and the date of the
commencement of suit. Obviously there is no chance for a dis-
pute regarding the method of measuring time. In comparatively
few cases will the parties differ as to the date whehi the physical
acts, constituting a trespas§, a promise or the like took place.'
There is still less chance for serious disagreement as to the
date of the facts constituting commencement of the action, for
this is usually a matter of record.2  Serious factual disputes
* The writer acknowledges many helpful suggestions of Professor Charles
E. Clark, of the Yale School of Law, in the preparation of this article,
1 Considering the large number of appellate cases concerning the statute
of limitations, it is remarkable how few involve disputes of facts as to
the time of accrual. Occasionally there appear to be conflicts as to the
date of a trespass. Moore & McFerrin v. Luehrman Hardwood L. Co., 82
Ark. 485, 102 S. W. 385 (1907); Dayton v. City of Asheville, 185 N. C. 12,
115 S. E. 827 (1903); Clark v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 168 N. C. 415, 84
S. E. 702 (1915); Thompson Bros. Lumber Co. v. Longini, 151 S. W. 888
(Tex. Civ. App. 1912) ; Southern Ry. v. Watts, 134 Va. 503, 114 S. E. 736
(1922). There are also many controversies as to when adverse possession
began. In a few cases the date of a contract or breach thereof is contro-
verted. Jones v. Bank of Commerce, 131 Ark. 362, 199 S. W. 103 (1917);
Wharton v. Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co., 156 S. W. 539 (Tex. Civ. App,
1913). This may be particularly so in breach of promise or alienation
of affections cases. Thrush v. Fullhart, 230 Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 4th, 1915);
Disch v. Closset, 244 Pac. 71 (Or. 1926). It is possible that the parties
differ both as to the rules of law as to accrual and the date of the physical
acts. See Pacific Improvement Co. v. Maxwell, 26 Calif. App. 265, 146
Pac. 900 (1915); Merchants Loan and Trust Co. v. Boucher, 115 Ill. App.
101 (1904); Ahrens v. Guaranty Trust Co., 125 Misc. 443, 211 N. Y.
Supp. 283 (1925); Newman v. Roach, 111 Okla. 269, 239 Pac. 640 (1925);
Smith v. Vermont Marble Co., 133 Atl. 355 (Vt. 1926).
2 Here the question of failure of proof is probably more frequent than
actual dispute, e. g., Murrell v. Goodwill, 159 La. 1057, 106 So. 564 (1925) ;
cf. McNeil v. Garland & Nash, 27 Ark. 343 (1871). There may be a jury
question in the jurisdictions in which prompt delivery of the summons to
the sheriff is necessary. Godshalk v. Martin, 200 S. W. 535 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1918); Michigan Ins. Bank v. Eldred, 130 U. S. 693, 9 Sup. Ct. 690
(1889). Even if there is agreement as to the dates, the question of reason-
able time has been held for the jury. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. v. Flatt, 36
S. W. 1029 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896); Panhandle Ry. v. Hubbard, 190 S. W.
[ 914]
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
sometimes arise with reference to certain exceptions which pre-
vent the statute from running, such as disability of the plaintiff
or absence from the jurisdiction and concealment on the part of
the defendant. 3
It is much more likely that the parties will differ as to rules
of law. Thus there are many legal questions with reference to
the exceptions which prevent the statute from running. Often
the problem is, upon admitted facts, when is the action deemed
to accrue in order to start the statute running, or when is the
suit deemed to be commenced for purposes of the statute.0 Par-
ties also differ concerning the proper period of limitations applic-
able, which generally involves the question of the legal nature
of plaintiff's right of action.7 There is sometimes the question
of law as to whether there is any period of limitation applicable
to a given situation."
Frequently the problem is simply to ascertain which party
793 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916). When a matter of notice dctermincs the date
of accrual there may be a sharp conflict as to the facts. Nat'l Par Ban:
v. Concordia Land & Timber Co., 159 La. 86, 105 So. 234 (1925). The
point may arise in case of failure to show the date instead of actual dif-
ference, e. g., American Law Book Co. v. Dykes, 278 S. W. 247 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1925). In such a situation, burden of proof becomes material. See
infra. note 10.
3 This is particularly true in the question of fraudulent concealment.
Laster v. Cox, 120 Kan. 452, 243 Pac. 1052 (1926). Or absence of the
defendant from the jurisdiction. Frett v. Holdorf, 201 Iowa, 748, 206
N. W. 609 (1925); Jayne v. Kane, 140 Va. 27, 124 S. E. 247 (1924). See
also Bowman v. Lemon, 154 N. E. 317 (Ohio, 1926).
-For examples of recent cases of this nature, see Murphy v. Graves,
170 Ark. 180, 279 S. W. 359 (1926); Inland Steel Co. v. Jelenovic, 150
N. E. 391 (Ind. App. 1926); Pullan v. Struthers, 207 N. W: 235 (Iowa,
1926); Walker v. Bennett, 209 Ky. 675, 273 S. W. 548 (1925); Nat'l Parh
Bank v. Concordia Land & Timber Co., supra. note 2; Steffen v. Stahl, 273
S. W. 118 (Mo. App. 1925); Brunnert v. Boeckmann's Estate, 276 S. W.
89 (Mo. App. 1925); Watkins v. Adamson, 113 Neb. 715, 204 N. W. 316
(1925) ; Le Brun v. Boston & M. R. R., 131 Atl. 441 (N. H. 1925) ; LarzEn
v. Duke, 116 Or. 25, 240 Pac. 227 (1925) ; Chicago R. I. & G. Ry. v. Duncan,
273 S. W. 908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Advance Rumely Thresher Co. v
Higgins, 279 S. W. 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926). Cf. Linebaugh v. Portland
Mortgage Co., 116 Or. 1, 239 Pac. 196 (1925).
5Many cases occur involving diverse situations, c. g., Reading Co. v.
Koons, 271 U. S. 58, 46 Sup. Ct. 405 (1926), noted in (1926) 35 Y=Is
LAW JOURNAL, 1017; Shapleigh Hardware Co. v. Spiro, 10 So. 209 (MTisz.
1925); Holman v. Randolph Nat'l Bank, 9S Vt. 66, 126 Atl. 500.
6 There has been considerable diversity in holdings upon this point. For
a note classifying the jurisdictions, see Gregory, Whcn Is an Action Com-
menced (1903) 8 VA. L. REG. 624.
7 See Murray v. Low, 8 Fed. (2d) 352 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925); Cover v.
Critcher, 143 Va. 357, 130 S. E. 238 (1925) ; White v. Turner-Hudnut Co.,
332 Ill. 133, 152 N. E. 572 (1926) ; Gilmour v. Johnson, 150 N. E. 87 (Mass.
1926); Empire Trust Co. v. Heinze, 242 N. Y. 475, 152 N. E. 266 (1026).
8 See Clark v. Millsap, 197 Calif. 765, 242 Pac. 918 (1926).
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has the burden of proof.9 In most cases this becomes important
only in so far as the court is required to instruct the jury that
the risk of non-persuasion is on one party or the other.1" The
verdict of the jury would generally be the same regardless of
9 At first sight, there seems to be nothing but utter confusion with refer-
ence to the burden of proof as to the bar of the statute of limitations.
However, the recognition of several diverse situations will clarify the mat-
ter considerably, although even then there is some disagreement. When
the problem is one of adverse possession, the burden is generally placed
upon the party who attempts to make out title by this means. Thus, as
to the character of the possession (whether adverse). Brown v. King, 5
Metc. 173 (Mass. 1842); Johns v. Johns, 244 Pa. 48, 90 Atl. 535 (1914);
Jansen v. Huerth, 143 Wis. 363, 127 N. W. 945 (1910); Brandt v. Ogden,
1 Johns. 156 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1806). Contra: Zebriska's Succession, 119
La. 1076, 44 So. 893 (1907); Ditmore v. Rexford, 165 N. C. 620, 81 S. E.
994 (1914). Likewise as to the length of time of possession. Gilbert v.
Southern Land and Timber Co., 53 Fla. 319, 43 So. 754 (1907); Archibald
v. New York Cent. & H. R. R., 157 N. Y. 574, 52 N. E. 567 (1899) ; Collins
v. Riley, 104 U. S. 322 (1881).
In case of special statutory actions, the burden is generally said to be
on the plaintiff to show that his action was commenced within the time
limited by the statute. See infra note 65. In case of the general statute
of limitations, the prevailing rule is to place the risk of non-persuasion on
the defendant. Kelly v. Kansas City So. Ry., 92 Ark. 465, 123 S. W. 664
(1909); Goodell's Ex'rs v. Gibbons, 91 Va. 608, 22 S. E. 504 (1895);
Schell v. Weaver, 225 Ill. 159, 80 N. E. 95 (1907); In re Camp's Estate,
188 Iowa, 734, 176 N. W. 795 (1920); Pracht v. McNee, 40 Kan. 1, 18
Pac. 925 (1888); Clark v. Logan County, 138 Ky. 676, 128 S. W. 1079
(1910); Matteson v. Blaisdell, 148 Minn. 352, 182 N. W. 442 (1921);
Gulfport Fertilizer Co. v. McMurphy, 114 Miss. 250, 75 So. 113 (1917);
Johnston v. Ragan, 265 Mo. 420, 178 S. W. 159 (1915); Van Burg v. Van
Engen, 76 Neb. 816, 107 N. W. 1006 (1906); Porter v. Magnetic Separator
Co., 115 App. Div. 333, 100 N. Y. Supp. 888 (1st. Dept. 1906), aff'd 190
N. Y. 511, 83 N. E. 1130 (1907); Torrey v. Campbell, 73 Okla. 201, 175
Pac. 524 (1918); Thomas v. Glendenning, 13 Utah, 47, 44 Pac. 652 (1896);
Goodyear Metallic Rubber Shoe Co. v. Baker's Estate, 81 Vt. 39, 69 Atl.
160 (1908); Virginia Lumber & Extract Co. v. McHenry Lumber Co., 122
Va. 111, 94 S. E. 173 (1917); Knight v. Chesapeake Coal Co., 99 W. Va.
261, 128 S. E. 318 (1925). Contra: Leigh v. Evans, 64 Ark. 26, 41 S. W.
427 (1897); McCarty v. Simon, 247 Mass. 514, 142 N. E. 806 (1924);
Ayres v. Hubbard, 71 Mich. 594, 40 N. W. 10 (1888); Jackson v. Int'l
Harvester Co., 188 N. C. 275, 124 S. E. 334 (1924). When the statutory
period has apparently run and the plaintiff relies on some exemption to
take the case out of the statute, the burden is on the plaintiff to show such
exception. United States v. Bighorn Sheep Co., 9 Fed. (2d) 192 (D. C.
Wyo. 1925); Watkins v. Martin, 69 Ark. 311, 65 S. W. 103, 425 (1902);
Manby v. Sweet Inv. Co., 78 Colo. 371, 242 Pac. 51 (1925); Mason v.
Henry, 152 N. Y. 529, 46 N. E. 837 (1897); Jones v. Coal Creek M. & M.
Co., 133 Tenn. 159, 180 S. W. 179 (1915). See also infra note 38. For
the English decisions on burden of proof, see Atkinson, Some Proeedural
Aspects of the Statute of Limitations (1927) 27 COL. L. REV. 157, 166-167.
10 If we could spread before us all the facts with reference to the liti-
gation, there would be little, if any, need for the concept of burden of
proof. Unfortunately, a law suit is not and probably cannot be con.
ducted in this manner. Certain elements are regarded as necessary to be
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what the court tells the jury as to the burden of proof. If the
court passes on the entire matter, the necessity of instructions
as to burden of proof would be avoided and a large number of
technical but really non-material errors could be prevented. One
of the most usual difficulties with reference to the statute of
limitations seems to be merely whether the defendant has taken
the proper procedural steps to entitle him to object on the ground
of the statute.11
The reported cases may not be entirely conclusive as to the
sort of questions which are ordinarily raised in trial courts, but
it is evident that most disputes between the parties with refer-
ence to time limitations must be over rules of substantive law
and procedure and are not differences of fact. Comparatively
seldom is there anything for a jury to decide. In spite of this
fact the orthodox plea of the statute of limitations was palpably
designed to treat the matter as a proper one for the determina-
tion of the jury. All the subtleties of confession and avoidance
were thrust upon the plea, with little or no attention to the kind
of problems raised at the trial.
Of course, the purely formal and logical attitude cannot be
overlooked entirely. In the interest of clarity, it seems desirable
to state the facts constituting the cause of action in the declara-
shown by the plaintiff and upon these he is said to have the burden of proof
or risk of non-persuasion. Other elements are said to be mattera of de-
fense and upon these the defendant bears the risk of non-persuasion.
Theoretically, the jury or other fact-finding body is supposed to decide a
point upon which the evidence is equally balanced against the party who
has the burden of proof. As a practical matter the inevitable element of
prejudice will overshadow the theoretical rule. Jurors have initial and
undisclosed prejudices and also acquire them from trivial incidents dur-
ing the trial. And remembering that the Colonel's lady and Judy O'Grady
are sisters under the skin, the same sort of process goes on in the court's
mind. From this standpoint, the burden of proof seems an unimportant and
purely theoretical sort of thing, with only a nuisance value. But many
cases are reversed because of instructions that the burden of proof is on
the wrong party. See cases infra note 11. Of course where there is an
absence of proof on a given matter and where the data are difficult or
impossible to obtain, the matter of burden of proof becomes very important
and virtually decides the case. See Nepean v. Doe d. Knight, 2 1. & W.
894 (Ex. Ch. 1837); Davie v. Briggs, 97 U. S. 628 (1873). Again the
matter of burden of proof may become important if the issue was entirely
overlooked at the trial.
"Innumerable cases might be cited. The following are typical in hold-
ing that the defense of the statute of limitations must be asserted in some
manner by the pleadings or is deemed waived. Brownrigg v. De Frees, 1906
Calif. 534, 238 Pac. 714 (1925); Brazell v. Hearn, 33 Ga. App. 606, 127
S. E. 479 (1925); Citizens-First Nat'l Bank v. Whiting, 112 0kla. 221, 240
Pac. 641 (1925) ; Selles v. Pagan, 8 Fed. (2d) 39 (C. C. A. 1st, 1925) ; cf.
Wulfsobn v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 11 Fed. (2d) 715 (C. C. A. 9th, 192G).
The court will err if it applies the statute of its own motion. Murphy v.
Murphy, 71 Calif. App. 389, 235 Pac. 653 (1925). See infra notes 88, 89.
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tion or complaint and to raise issue on these facts by denial or
to plead specially additional facts which are consistent with those
stated by the plaintiff. But too much reliance hasbeen placed
upon this so-called logical feature of our pleading. Progress
and efficiency are more apt to result from greater emphasis upon
framing our procedural rules so that: (1) whenever possible,
the disputed points may be settled in advance of trial; (2) ample
notice 12 may be given to opbonents; (3) the burden of pleading
certain sorts of facts may be governed by ideas as to whether
those elements should be disfavored.
RAISING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BY DEMURRER
When we desire the disposal of a case on an issue of law be-
fore trial, we naturally think of the demurrer. It is the one
procedural device which the common law had for the accom-
plishment of this end. Should a declaration, complaint or peti-
tion show on its face that the cause of action is not barred by
the statute of limitations in order to be demurrer-proof? As
the writer has elsewhere endeavored to show, the plaintiff is
not obliged to state expressly in his declaration that the cause
of action accrued within the period allotted by the statute of
limitations of 21 James I.13  Nevertheless the pleader at com-
mon law 1 -4 and also usually under the codes I is obliged to al-
12 The writer has already indicated above that he does not favor aban-
donment of ultimate fact pleading. Some advocates of pleading reform
favor a system of notice pleading which departs radically from present
American practices. See Whittier, Notice Pleading (1918) 31 IHA. L.
Ruv. 501. Among other difficulties, the extreme notice-pleading system
would result in the loss of the benefits of enforced preparation for trial,
through the drafting of proper ultimate fact pleadings. Undoubtedly the
notice-giving function of pleading is receiving increased emphasis by
courts and writers, with a corresponding decrease of attention to the
issue-raising function. Yet there is often a failure to comprehend that
pleading to a specific issue will give notice, while adequate notice will sub-
stantially, though not gramatically, isolate the issue. In general, pleadings
should give notice in such a way as to avoid surprise of the opponents at
the trial. But it is not necessary or desirable to go to the extreme of
stating what the testimony is expected to be. See infra note 120. Often
the disclosure of the legal theory upon which the pleader proceeds is suffi-
cient to avoid surprise. See text infra, circa notes 117-123.
1 Atkinson, op. cit. supra note 9, at 165-168. Because the statute of 21
James I relating to personal actions is the basis of American legislation
regarding limitations, the English decisions under it may be regarded vir-
tually as the "common law" upon the subject.
14 STEPHON, PLEADING (Tyler's ed. 1895) 278. This is the traditional
statement of the rule. But there is a naturalness in the allegation of dates
which would scarcely necessitate a strict rule on the subject. See (1926)
35 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 487, 488. A few common law jurisdictions have
followed the cue of Stephen who announces the rule to be a formal one
and have declared that unless time is "material" the dates need not be al-
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lege the dates upon -which the material facts transpired. It
would seem that if these dates were truly alleged, it would ap-
pear from the plaintiff's pleading whether or not the statute had
run. Of course it would be possible for a plaintiff to allege, re-
gardless of truth, a recent date clearly within the period of
limitation, but such a practice is dangerous because of the pos-
sibility of a continuance '1 at the trial or even a fatal variance
between pleadings and proof.- Normally we find the correct
date stated by the plaintiff. In such a situation it would be
reasonable tq regard a pleading which showed that the action
accrued beyond the statutory period, as demurrable on that ac-
count. But the English and most American decisions in com-
mon law cases and in absence of statutory provisions hold that
a demurrer to the declaration does not raise the point of the
bar of general statutes of limitations."'
Three reasons have been asserted for this position. First, as
the date of commencement of the action is not shown upon the
face of the pleadings, it is said that the bar does not appear for
the purpose of the demurrer. 0 While it is a common statement
that "a demurrer searches the record," 20 this does not seem to
mean "record" in the sense of the entire judgment roll, but only
the pleadings.21 A way out of this difficulty has been suggested,
leged. Fla. Rev. Gen. Stat. (1920) § 2625; Bld. Ann. Code (Bagby, 1924)
art. 75, § 6.
Is See (1926) 35 YALE LAW JOUNAL, 487-8, notes 2, 3. In Iowa a statute
provides that time need not be stated. Iowa Code (1924) § 11194. But this
statute does not prevent the bar of the statute of limitations from being
raised by demurrer. Cooley v. Blaine, 163 Iowa, 117, 143 N. W. 431 (1913).
10 See (1926) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 487, 494.
1? Ordinarily time is regarded as immaterial in the sense that one time
may be alleged and another proved. Ibid. 491. However, it has occa-
sionally been said that one cannot allege a time within the statutory period
and prove an earlier date beyond the statutory period. See Hill v. New
Haven, 37 Vt. 501 (1865). But see Brand v. Longstreet, 4 N. J. L. 325
(1816).
18 See cases cited infra notes 19, 27, 35. An excellent collection of cita-
tions of earlier American cases is found in AIsnS, CASEs ON ComrxIo LIAW
PLEADING (1905) 129-132. The note makes no distinction, however, be-
tween authorities arising under common law rules and those arising under
the codes and statutory actions.
39 Thursby v. Warren, Cro. Car. 159 (K. B. 1630); Hawidngs v. Bill-
head, Cro. Car. 404 (K. B. 1636); Gould v. Johnson, 2 Ld. Raym. 838
(K. B. 1702); Bulkley v. Norwich & W. Ry., 81 Conn. 284, 70 Atl. 1021
(1908); Vencill v. Flynn Lumber Co., 94 W. Va. 396, 119 S. E. 104 (1923).
See an excellent comment by Professor Leo Carlin, discussing the matter
from the standpoint of West Virginia cases and to some extent generally.
(1924) 30 W. VA. L. Q. 110. For the Illinois decisions upon the question
see (1925) 20 ILL. L. REV. 391.
20 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 160. As everyone will recognize, the
term "record" has many meanings.
23 Bukley v. Norwick & W. Ry., supra note 19. But see Brown v. Han-
cock, Cro. Car. 115 (C. P. 1629).
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viz., by craving oyer of the writ, in which case the writ may
be considered for purposes of the demurrer, evidently much
the same as in the case of profert and oyer of a sealed instru-
ment.23 On the whole, most cases have not considered this ob-
jection - and the courts are apparently satisfied to learn the
date of the commencement of the action from any authentic
court documents, whether pleadings or not.24  The point is a
technical one. This appears especially in those jurisdictions
where the suit is deemed commenced at the date of the filing
of the declaration or complaint. The file-marks on the cover of
the pleadings will generally show the date of commencement
of suit.2 5 It is, indeed, a fine distinction to say that a demurrer
will look to the face of the pleadings and not to the official
stamping on the back! There is plenty of authority to the effect
that a court should take judicial notice of the date of commence-
ment of the instant cause.28
Another objection which has troubled the courts 27 is the gen-
eral rule that allegations of time are "immaterial." As the plain-
tiff is not usually obliged to prove the dates as alleged," the
time is not deemed sufficiently established or admitted by the
allegation to dispose of the matter upon demurrer. The state-
ment of Stephen 29 to the effect that the pleader may allege
any date he pleases is no doubt a contributing factor to this
position. The writer believes that Stephen's attitude is an ex-
tremely unfortunate one, is not in accord with present notions
and is indeed a dangerous one for the pleader himself.30 The
22Lambert v. Ensign Mfg. Co., 42 W. Va. 813, 26 S. E. 431 (1896).
23 See Cooke v. Grahams Adm'r, 3 Cranch, 229 (U. S. 1805).
24 Cooley v. Main, supra note 15; Fleischman Const. Co. v. United
States, 270 U. S. 349, 46 Sup. Ct. 284 (1926); Creswell v. Spokane County,
30 Wash. 620, 71 Pac. 195 (1903). See also cases infra notes 26, 39, 51, 56
57, 60, 62, 69.
25 See Smith v. Day, 39 Or. 531, 64 Pac. 812, 65 Pac. 1055 (1901); Pat-
terson v. Thompson, 90 Fed. 647 (C. C. Or. 1898) where this sort of data
has been considered on demurrer.
26N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) §7937 (13) (19); Hollenbach v.
Schnabel, 101 Calif. 312, 35 Pac. 872 (1894); Altoona Q. M. Co. v. Integral
Q. M. Co., 114 Calif. 100, 45 Pac. 1047 (1896); State v. Stevens, 56 Kan.
720, 44 Pac. 992 (1896); Linehan v. Morton, 221 Ill. App. 70 (1921);
Chapman v. Currie, 51 Mo. App. 40 (1892); Withers v. Gillespy, 7 S. & R.
10 (Pa. 1821).; Searls v. Knapp, 5 S. D. 325, 58 N. W. 807 (1894); 4
WIGMORE, EIDMENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2579. This point is assumed and taken
as obvious in the many cases infra where the statute of limitations is held
properly raised on demurrer.
27Bulldey v. Norwick & W. Ry., supra note 19; Gebhart v. Adams, 23
Ill. 397 (1860).; see Lee v. Rogers, 1 Lev. 110 (I. B. 1664) and Central
.Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 156 Iowa, 104, 135 N. W. 721 (1912).
28 (1926). 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 491, and authorities there cited.
29 op. cit. supra note 14, at 279.
30 See text supra, at notes 16, 17.
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true date should be, and indeed generally is, alleged as far as
possible. It is perfectly true that the allegation of time is "im-
material" in the sense that proof of a different date than alleged
is not usually regarded as a fatal variance. Yet there is no
reason why the allegation cannot be regarded as "material" 31
for purposes of demurrer. If a plaintiff alleges a date of ac-
crual of his cause of action beyond the statutory period, it is
fair to take him at his word. Many courts so consider the mat-
ter.32  Amendments are now permitted after demurrer is filed 23
and this may prevent any injustice because of a clerical error
of the plaintiff's counsel as to the dates. Such amendments
might well be limited to meritorious cases where the plaintiff
can make a showing to the effect that his right is not barred.:4
A third objection is that if a demurrer is permitted to raise
the question of the bar of the statute, the plaintiff may be robbed
of an opportunity to show some exception which prevents the
bar from operating35 If the matter is raised by a plea in con-
fession and avoidance, the plaintiff may bring himself within
the exception by replication and, of course, prove the necessary
facts at the trial. Even in the cases where the defense is
raised by merely pleading the general issue or general denial,
the plaintiff could be given a chance to prove himself witlin
the exception at the trial. But in earlier times at least, there
would be no opportunity for the court to consider the matter of
exceptions if the defendant could have advantage of the de-
fense of the statute of limitations on demurrer to thie declara-
tion. Some courts have solved the difficulty by requiring the
plaintiff to bring himself within his exception in his declaration
31 The Supreme Court of the United States recently took this position in
a criminal case in which the trial court quashed the indictment because of
the federal statute of limitations. United States v. Noveck, 271 U. S. 201,
46 Sup. Ct. 476 (1926). The court presumes that the date charged in the
indictment is the true one, although of course the prosecution might have
proved another date without fatal variance. But see Amory v. McGregor,
12 Johns. 287 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1815).
32 See references cited supra note 24.
33 Conn. Prac. Book (1922) § 189.
34 See Thornton v. Jackson, 129 Ga. 700, 59 S. E. 905 (1907); Danzig
v. Baroody, 140 App. Div. 542, 125 N. Y. Supp. 797 (1st Dept. 1910).
3 Trankersley v. Robinson, Cro. Car. 163 (K. B. 1631); Stile v. Finch,
Cro. Car. 381 (K. B. 1635); Hawkings v. Billhead, s.pra note 19; Gunton
v. Hughes, 181 Ill. 132, 54 N. E. 895 (1899); Lesher v. U. S. Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 239 Ill. 502, 88 N. E. 208 (1909); Charters v. Citizens Nat'1
Bank, 84 Ind. App. 15, 145 N. E. 517 (1925) ; Callan v. Bodine, 81 N. J. L.
240, 79 Atl. 1057 (1911); Oldham v. Rieger, 145 N. C. 254, 53 S. E. 1091
(1907) (for statute see infra note 61); Murdock v. Herndon's E.'r, 4 Hen.
& M. 200 (Va. 1809) ; Shreck v. Va. Hot Springs Co., 140 Va. 429, 125 S. E.
316 (1924); Vencill v. Flynn Lumber Co., supra note 19. Contra: Kirk-
patrick v. Monroe, 234 II1. App. 213 (1924), criticized in (1925) 20 ILL. L.
Ruv. 391.
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or complaint if the latter shows the action would otherwise be
barred. 0 Under modern practice, the facts necessary to show
the exception could be added to the declaration or complaint by
amendment either before or after the decision on the demurrer.
But the practice of anticipating the defense of the statute in
the plaintiff's original or amended pleading would seem strange
to a common law pleader. We have come to regard the statute
as a defense 37 in both the pleading and proof stages. Although
there is no inherent reason why we should not regard the mat-
ter of a timely suit as one of the elements of the plaintiff's af-
firmative case,38 we seem committed in the main to the opposite
policy. While the cases in which exceptions are applicable are
not extremely numerous, yet they are frequent enough to be of
importance in framing procedural rules. The possibility of the
existence of exceptions constitutes the only serious reason for
the common law position that the bar of the statute could not
be asserted by demurrer.
In early cases, the English Court of Chancery allowed the de-
fense of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer to
the bill .3  There may be several factors which contribute to this
holding. Demurrers were borrowed from the common law prac-
30 Ferrier v. McCabe, 129 Minn. 342, 152 N. W. 734 (1915); Douglas v.
Corry, 46 Ohio St. 349, 21 N. E. 440 (1889). But most cases at law do not
require this anticipation. Charters v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, supra note 35;
Graziani v. Ernst, 169 Ky. 751, 185 S. W. 99 (1916); Willis v. Wileman, 53
Misc. 462, 102 N. Y. Supp. 1004 (Sup. Ct. 1907). See also cases supra
note 35. In equity, most courts would probably require a plaintiff to
anticipate the defense of the exceptions. See infra notes 47, 51. Upon
anticipation of defenses in general, see Clark, The Complaint in Code
Pleading (1926) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 259.
7 4 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 26, § 2538.
38 No one.has yet written quite satisfactorily upon the subject of why
burden of proof on particular issues is placed on one party or the other.
Thayer regarded the subject as one of particular difficulty. TnAYER,
PRELImINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (1898) 369-375, 388, 389. Some
writers have said that a party is obliged to bear the onus upon affirmative
facts but not upon negative facts. ODGERS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE (8th
ed. 1918) 308-310; of. LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF EQUITY PLEADING (1883)
§ 108. Wigmore believes that the matter is determined by considerations
of fairness and convenience and is also dependent upon the pleadings, Viz.,
one has the burden of proof upon matters which he must allege according
to the ordinary rules of pleading. 4 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 26, § 2486.
To determine burden of proof by the rules of pleading or by the affirmative
or negative nature of facts seems inadequate; manner of pleading should
depend on burden of proof rather than vice versa. Atkinson, op. cit. supra
note 9, n. 60; Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon
the Burden of Proof (1920) 68 U. PA. L. REv. 307, 309, n.
-39 Saunders v. Hord, 1 Chan. Rep. 184 (1660) ; see Pearson v. Pulley, 1
Chan. Cas. 102 (1668). For later cases, see infra notes 44-49. As to the




tice 41 and were not at first distinguished from pleas. Perhaps
the seventeenth century chancellors saw in the demurrer a
means of disposing of the suit at an early stage and cared little
about the common law technicalities of looldng only to the face
of the pleadings and of regarding allegations of time as for-
mal or immaterial matters. In addition, the chancery bill, being
much more verbose and less standardized -2 than the common
law declaration, might be expected to show the facts constitut-
ing any exception which prevented the statute from running, if
any existed and were necessary to show a timely suit. The com-
plaint would naturally suggest any element which would nega-
tive laches.43 This fact would probably compel the complainant
to state facts which would bring him within the limitation period
or within the shorter or further time allowed in the exceptional
cases. However, at one time the common law rule against the
use of the demurrer to raise the point threatened to prevail in
equity. Lord Hardwicke4 and Lord Thurlow 4 declared that
a demurrer would not be permitted to raise the point as the
complainant would be prevented from replying or amending his
bill to show that the case came within an exception to the stat-
ute. In a slightly later case - Sir Thomas Plumer, Vice-Chan-
cellor, seemed to be of the opinion that only in the rare case
will the bill affirmatively show that the statutory period has
elapsed and that none of the exceptions alplied so as to decide
the point upon demurrer. But in most of the later cases, in
absence of the complainant's showing that the case was within
one of the exceptions, the bill was demurrable if the statute
had apparently run.4 7 Lord Kenyon has been credited with the
first decision 48l to this effect. Through the great influence of
40 LAxGDELL, op. cit. supra note 38, §§ 53, 92, 93.
41 Ibid. § 93.
42 Ibid. § 55.
43 See Prince v. Heylin, 1 Atk. 493 (Ch. 1737).
44Aggas v. Pickerell, 3 Atk. 225 (Ch. 1745); Gregor v. Molesworth, 2
yes. Sr. 109 (Ch. 1750); see Prince v. Heylin, supra note 43.
4- Deloraine v. Browne, 3 Bro. C. C. 633 (Ch. 1792). See discuszion
of this case, generally disapproving it, in Hovenden v. Annesley, 2 Sch. &
Lef. 607, 637 (Ch. 1806).
46 Hodle v. Healey, 1 Ves. & Bea. 536 (Ch. 1313).
47 Iutloe v. Smith, 3 Anst. 709 (Ex. Ch. 1796); Foster v. Hodgzon, 19
Ves. Jr. 180 (Ch. 1812); Hoare -. Peck, 6 Sim. 51 (Ch. 1833); Smith v.
Fox, 6 Hare, 386 (Ch. 1848). See Hovenden v. Annesley, spra note 45;
Hardy v. Reeves, 4 Ves. Jr. 466, 479 (Ch. 1799).
48 Beckford v. Close, decided at the Cockpit in 1784 and evidently unre-
ported. The case was apparently well laIown to the chancellors and the
bar for it is referred to in Foster v. Hodgson, supra note 47, Deloraine
v. Browne, supra note 45, Hardy v. Reeves, szpra note 47 and Hovenden
v. Annesley, svpra note 45. Saunders v. Hord, sapra note 39, decided
more than a century before Becdord v. Close, seems to have held that
the statute of limitations could be asserted by demurrer.
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Lord Redesdale, 49 the rule became firmly established in the
chancery practice of England. It is a common statement of
textwriters that in equity, the defense of the statute of limita-
tions can be raised by demurrer. 0 In this 'country it is prob-
ably the general rule,51 although there is some dissent.r2 An-
other feature of the equity practice is worth noticing. If the
complaint did not show the bar of the statute, the point might
be raised by plea.5 3 This is important because the bill might be
dismissed without discovery from the defendant as would result
if he were compelled to answer." The defendant's contention,
if well taken, would dispose of the case at a preliminary stage,
Which is a factor usually very desirable to both court and par-
ties.
A fair generalization of the position taken by courts in ab-
sence of statute is that a demurrer might raise the point in an
equity suit but not in a common law action. In the code juris-
dictions there is marked diversity. Some states 15 follow the
common law rule and refuse to permit the point to be raised
49 As John Mitford, before his elevation to the bench, he was the losing
counsel in Deloraine v. Browne, supra note 45. He faithfully enunciated
the doctrine of that case in his text, MITFoRD, EQUITY PLEADING, * 213.
But as Lord Redesdale, he firmly announced the doctrine for which he had
contended in Deloraine v. Browne. Hovenden v. Annesley, supra note 45.
50 STORY, EQUITY PLEADING (8th ed. 1870) §§ 484, 503, 760; MITFORD &
TYLER, PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN EQUITY (1890) 306, n., 347; HEARD,
EQUITY PLEADING (1889) 65; SHIPI~AN, EQUITY PLEADING (1897) 398.
51 Wisner v. Ogden, Fed. Cas. No. 17,914 (C. C. D. C. 1827); Henry
County v. Winnebago Drainage Co., 52 Ill. 456 (1869); City of Fulton v.
Northern Ill. College, 158 Ill. 333, 42 N. E. 138 (1895) ; McLean v. Barton,
Harr. Ch. 279 (Mich. 1841); Campau v. Chene, 1 Mich. 400 (1850); Fogg
v. Price, 145 Mass. 513, 14 N. E. 741 (1888); Crawford's Adm'rs. v.
Turner Adm'rs., 67 W. Va. 564, 68 S. E. 179 (1910); Humbert v. Trinity
Church, 7 Paige, 195 (N. Y. Ch. 1838); Gephart v. Sprigg, 124 Md. 111,
91 Atl. 772 (1914); Erickson v. Insurance Co., 66 Fla. 154, 63 So.
716 (1913).
52Hubble v. Poff, 98 Va. 646, 37 S. E. 277 (1900); see Vyse v. Richards,
208 Mich. 383, 175 N. W. 392 (1919) ; LANGDELL, op. cit. supra note 38, § 109.
53 MITFORD & TYLER, op. cit. supra note 50, at 356; STORY, op. cit.
supra note 50, §§ 751-756; LANGDELL, op. cit. supra note 38, § 110;
HEARD, op. cit. supra note 50, at 88, 89; SHIPmAN, op. cit. supra note 50, at
465. Indeed, even if the bill did show that the statute had run, it
seems that the point could be raised by plea or answer as well as demurrer.
See infra note 134.
54 Langdell, op. cit. supra note 38, § 98.
55 The Indiana, Kentucky and Oklahoma cases are inclined to allow
demurrers if no exceptions can be applicable. Leard v. Leard, 30 Ind. 171
(1868); Hanna v. Jeffersonville Ry., 32 Ind. 113 (1869); Low v. Ramsey,
135 Ky. 333, 122 S. W. 167 (1909); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Wilcox, 32
Okla. 51, 121 Pac. 656 (1912). But these courts will not permit the
point to be asserted by demurrer if an exception might possibly be applic-
able. Falley v. Gribling, 128 Ind. 110, 26 N. E. 794 (1891); Brashears'
Heirs v. Brashears, 144 Ky. 451, 139 S. W. 738 (1911); Graziani v. Ernst,
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by demurrer. The "Minnesota court =' has declared that it is
impelled by the code to follow the equity rule, which of course
permitted the point to be raised by demurrer. Other jurisdic-
tionS57 sustain demurrers on the ground that a complaint which
shows that the ordinary limitation period has run and does not
bring the case within some exception, does not state facts suffi-
cient to constitute a cause of action.
The matter is further complicated by special statutory provi-
sions. In several code jurisdictions, the statutes , relating to
demurrers expressly mention the bar of the statute of limita-
tions as a ground of demurrer if it appears on the face of the
complaint. The effect of such a provision could be whittled away
to practically nothing by taking the position that it is only ap-
plicable when the complaint shows that none of the exceptions
to the statute can possibly apply.- But the courts in these
jurisdictions have assumed for purposes of the demurrer that
no exception is applicable unless the complaint shows that one
exists.60 In a few states there is a statutory provision ", that
supra note 36; Klineline v. Head, 205 Ky. 644, 266 S. W. 370 (1924) ; Polson
v. Revard, 104 Okla. 279, 232 Pac. 435 (1924). See supra note 35.
!6 Ferrier v. McCabe, supra note 36. This has been applied also to time
limitations imposed by act of the parties themselves. Fitger Brewing Co.
v. American Bonding Co., 115 Minn. 78, 131 N. W. 1067 (1911); cf.
Ausplund v. Aetna Indemnity Co., infra, note 135; Ideal Brick Co. v.
Gentry, 191 N. C. 636, 132 S. E. 800 (1926).
57 Mueller v. Light, 92 Ark. 522, 123 S. W. 646 (1909); Douglas v.
Corry, supra note 36 (before passage of the statutory provision given
infra note 58); Kansas State Bank v. Shaible, 118 Kan. 73, 234 Pac. 40
(1925); Garth v. Mlotter, 248 Mo. 477, 154 S. W. 733 (1913); Cowhick:
v. Shingle, 5 Wyo. 87, 37 Pac. 689 (1894) ; BRYANT, CODE PLE,%DG (2d ed.
1899) 193; Cf. POMEROY, CODE REmEDIES (4th ed. 1904) § 5S9. See Upton
v. McLaughlin, 105 U. S. 640 (1881). Some jurisdictions insist that the
demurrer, while it comes under the general class of "facts insufficient
to constitute a cause of action" must specially point out that the statute
of limitations is relied upon. California Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.
Sierra Valleys Ry., 158 Calif. 690, 112 Pac. 274 (1910); Yost v. Irwin, 53
Colo. 269, 125 Pac. 526 (1912); Rogers v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co.,
28 Idaho, 609, 156 Pac. 98 (1916); State v. Spencer, 79 Mo. 314 (1883);
Standard Oil Co. v. Nat'l Surety Co., 107 So. 559 (Miss. 1926); see Cooley
v. Maine, supra note 15; Lamm v. Gohlman, Lester & Co., 279 S. W. 552
(Tex. Civ. App. 1925). Contra: Merriam v. Miller, 22 Neb. 218, 34 N. W.
625 (1887); Seymour v. Railway, 44 Ohio St. 12, 4 N. E. 236 (1886).
58 Alaska Comp. Laws (1913) § 890; Ariz. Rev. Stat. (1913) § 468;
Ia. Code (1924) § 11141; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1920) § 11309; Or. Laws
(Olsen, 1920) § 68; Wash. Comp. Stat. (Remington, 1922) § 259; Wis.
Stat. (1921) § 2649.
59 See supra note 55.
60 District Township of Carroll v. District Township of Arcadia, 79 Iowa,
96, 44 N. W. 236 (1890); Murray v. Low, supra note 7 (under Oregon
practice).
G'AMont. Rev. Codes (Choate, 1921) §9065; N. C. Cons. Stat. (1919)
§ 405; N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) § 7358; 1 S. C. Code (1922) § 313;
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the defense of limitations can be raised only by answer. This
might be interpreted as merely insisting that the point could
not be raised by general denial and not as excluding the possi-
bility of a demurrer when otherwise applicable.02 But the courts
of these states generally consider the enactment as a prohibition
against the use of the demurrer to raise the defense 3
A distinction has been drawn between the general statutes
of limitation and time limitations applicable to special statutory
actions. Among the latter, civil actions for death are most com-
mon. In these, the commencement of the action within the time
specified is generally considered to be a fact which the plaintiff
must plead 04 and prove.03 The traditional justification of such
S. D. Rev. Code (1919) § 2263. In New York, C. P. A., § 30, formerly
provided, following the older code provision, that the point could be
asserted only by answer but was amended to agree with Rule 107. N. Y.
Ann. Cons. Laws (1921) c. 372, § 1. See infra notes 78-79. Or. Laws
(Olsen, 1920) § 3; Wash. Comp. Stat. (Remington, 1922) § 155; Wis.
Stat. (1921) § 4206 provide that the statute of limitations must be raised
by either answer or demurrer. Ariz. Rev. Stat. (1913) § 727 provides that
the point can be raised only by answer but § 468 provides that the statute
of limitations is ground for demurrer. Tex. App. Civ. & Crim. Stat. (Ver-
non, 1920) § 5706 is to the effect that the statute must be specially pleaded.
62 See Motes v. Gila Val. G. & N. Ry., 8 Ariz. 50, 68 Pac. 532 (1902),
where the court was impelled to adopt this construction in order to recon-
cile then existing statutes. Probably the same result would be reached
under the present statutes-see supra note 61. The Texas statute is
differently worded from most of the other statutes cited in note 61 and
is open to the interpretation that a special demurrer asserting the statute
of limitations may raise the point. See Lamm v. Gohlman, Lester & Co.,
supra note 57; Ogg v. Ogg, 165 S. W. 912 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914);
Oswald v. Giles, 178 S. W. 677 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
03 Moody v. Wike, 170 N. C. 541, 87 S. E. 350 (1915); Shane v. Peoples,
25 N. D. 188, 141 N. W. 737 (1913); Guerard v. Jenkins, 80 S. C. 223,
61 S. E. 258 (1908); Fulmore v. Fulmore, 115 S. C. 213, 105 S. E. 285
-(1920); cf. Northwestern Mortgage Trust Co. v. Schatz, 35 S. D. 379,
152 N. W. 509 (1915); see Grogan v. Valley Trading Co., 30 Mont. 229,
76 Pac. 211 (1904); Willis v. Willeman, 53 Misc. 462, 102 N. Y. Supp. 1004
(Sup. Ct. 1907). Contra: Howell v. Howell, 15 Wis. 60 (1862); Chemung
Canal Bank v. Lowery, 93 U. S. 72 (1876). The Wisconsin statute has
-been altered since so as expressly to permit the point to be raised by de-
murrer. See supra notes 58, 61.
04 There is some doubt as to how specifically the plaintiff must allege
commencement of the action within the period. It has been held that he
must allege the matter in so many words and that it is not sufficient
merely to state the date of the accrual of the action under a videlicit.
Seitter v. West Jersey and S. R., 79 N. J. L. 277, 75 Atl. 435 (1910);
Annuziato v. Eisner, 2 N. J. Misc. 513, 124 Atl. 774 (1924); Carey v.
Deems, 129 Atl. 191 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1925). While it may be wiser to plead
expressly that the action was commenced -within the time allowed by
statute, most courts do not hold this necessary. It is sufficient if a date
of accrual is pleaded which is within the period. Devine v. Chicago, 213 Ill.
App. 299 (1919); Linehan v. Morton, 221 Ill. App. 70 (1921); Bishop v.
Dignan, 223 Ill. App. 178 (1921); Burnham v. Peoria Ry., 223 Ill. App.
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a distinction is that in the statutory actions the right as well
as the remedy is barred."C The explanation is also offered that
these actions are created by the very legislation which contains
the limitation while the general statute of limitations applies to
the sorts of rights which were recognized at common law.G7 But
so far as time limitations are concerned, the operative facts of
each transaction, and not the period of time during which sini-
lar rights have been recognized, would seem to be the important
factors. A more plausible reason might be that the special stat-
utory rights of action are disfavored to the extent of burdening
the plaintiff with the additional operative fact of a timely suit.
This may be sound in the case of some statutory actions, such
as possibly those against municipalities. But there seems to be
no reason of present social policy which would regard actions
for battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution or slander
with greater favor than actions for wrongful death. About the
only really adequate ground for permitting the demurrer to
raise the point in the statutory actions while denying it in the
common law actions is that in the statutory actions there are
usually no exceptions by which a plaintiff might possibly excuse
the delay in bringing suit and the exceptions of the general stat-
utes do not ordinarily apply.c" As the only real difficulty in sus-
573 (1921) ; Luka v. Behn, 225 Ill. App. 105 (1922) ; Ramsey v. Mansell, 233
Ill. App. 373 (1924); Bright v. Thatcher, 202 Mo. App. 301, 215 S. W.
788 (1919); Mayberry v. Iron Mt. Co., 211 Mo. App. 610, 249 S. W. 161
(1923); Brothers v. Rutland Ry., 71 Vt. 48, 42 Atl. 980 (1898).
65 Gulf States Steel Co. v. Jones, 204 Ala. 48, 85 So. 264 (1920); Poff v.
New England Telephone Co., 72 N. H. 164, 55 Atl. 891 (1903); Gulledge
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 147 N. C. 234, 60 S. E. 1134 (1908); Hatch v.
Alamance Ry., 183 N. C. 617, 112 S. E. 529 (1923) ; see Lapsley v. Public
Service Corp., 75 N. J. L. 266, 68 Atl. 113 (1908).
rGThe Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, 7 Sup. Ct. 140 (188); Korb v.
Bridgeport Gas Light Co., 91 Conn. 395, 99 At. 1048 (1917); Rodman v.
Missouri Pac. Ry., 65 Kan. 645, 70 Pac. 642 (1902); Harwood v. Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry., 101 Kan. 215, 171 Pac. 354 (1917); Bement v. Grand
Rapids Ry., 194 Mich. 64, 160 N. W. 424 (191G); Poff v. New England
Telephone Co., supra note 65; Hill v. New Haven, spra note 17.
67 United States v. Rundle, 27 Wash. 7, 67 Pac. 395 (1901); The Har-
risburg, supra note 66. See also Chandler v. Chicago & A. Ry., 251 Mo.
592, 158 S. W. 35 (1913). It is possible that the courts which use such
language, have in mind the distinction between an exception and a proviso,
but the analogy is not pursued and probably cannot be justified by the
language of the statutory provisions.
6s Partee v. St. Louis Ry., 204 Fed. 970 (C. C. A. Sth, 1913) ; Lewis v.
Pawnee Bill's Wild West Co., 6 Pen. 316, 66 Atl. 471 (Del. 1907); Rod-
man v. Missouri Pac. Ry., supra note 66; Foster v. Yazoo & M. V. Ry.,
72 Miss. 886, 18 So. 380 (1895); Gulf & S. I. Ry. v. Bradley, 110 Miss.
152, 69 So. 666 (1915); Gengo v. Mardis, 103 Neb. 104, 170 N. W. 811
(1919); see Hill v. New Haven, mupra note 17, at 511. But see Nelson
v. Galveston Ry., 78 Tex. 621, 14 S. W. 1021 (1890) (posthumous child)
and Sharrow v. Inland Lines, Ltd., 214 N. Y. 101, 108 N. E. 217 (1915).
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taining a demurrer in the common law actions is absent, most
courts sustain demurrers in the statutory actions although they
will not do so in ordinary common law or even in equity cases.0
But some courts have recognized exceptions to the limitations
in the statutory actions and on this account have refused to
permit the question to be raised by demurrer.
T
It is not always clearly recognized that the demurrer serves
two distinct functions. The first might be called its disposing
function because it is a means of finally determining the contro-
versy.71 The parties may state the facts so fairly and truth-
fully that both will agree upon the facts and disagree only as
to whether the facts are sufficient in law to constitute a cause
of action or a defense. Under such circumstances the decision
of the demurrer will finally adjudicate the whole dispute, with-
Go Of course all jurisdictions which allow the point to be raised by de-
murrer in ordinary common law actions would permit it here; in addition,
the following jurisdictions allow the point to be raised by demurrer in the
special statutory actions. DeMartino v. Siemon, 90 Conn. 527, 97 Atl.
765 (1916); State v. Parks, 148 Md. 477, 129 Atl. 793 (1925); Dolenty v.
Broadwater County, 45 Mont. 261, 122 Pac. 919 (1912); King v. Mayor of
Butte, 71 Mont. 309, 230 Pac. 62 (1924).; Lapsley v. Public Service Corp.,
supra note 65; Savings Bank of Richmond v. Powhatan Clay Mfg. Co., 102
Va. 274, 46 S. E. 294 (1904); Lambert v. Ensign Mfg. Co., supra note 22;
see Phillips v. Grand Trunk W. Ry., 236 U. S. 662, 35 Sup. Ct. 444 (1915);
Kansas City So. Ry. v. Wolf, 261 U. S. 133, 43 Sup. Ct. 259 (1923).
70 Sharrow v. Inland Lines, Ltd., supra note 68. But see Merz v. Brook-
lyn, 57 Hun, 518, 11 N. Y. Supp. 778 (1890), aff'd 128 N. Y. 617, 28 N. E.
253 (1891); and of. Schwertfeger v. Scandinavian-American Line, 186 App.
Div. 89, 174 N. Y. Supp. 147 (1st Dept. 1919), aff'd 226 N. Y. 696, 123
N. E. 888 (1919) (action brought under New Jersey statute). In Casey v.
American Bridge Co., 116 Minn. 461, 134 N. W. 111 (1912), the exceptions
of the ordinary statute of limitations are held applicable in case of the time
limitation for commencement of death actions. The modern tendency of
decision and legislation is said to be in this direction. (1920) 5 CoRN. L. Q.
345. The Minnesota courts would undoubtedly permit the point to be
raised by demurrer although an exception were applicable. See supra
note 56. Illinois formerly refused to consider the time limitation in the
death action as "conditions precedent" and consequently refused to allow
the point to be raised by demurrer. Wall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 200
Ill. 66, 65 N. E. 632 (1920) ; see Heinberger v. Elliott Switch Co., 245 Ill.
448, 92 N. E. 297 (1910). But the court now regards the bringing of the
suit within the period allowed as a condition of liability. Carlin v. Peer-
less Gas Light Co., 283 Ill. 142, 119 N. E. 66 (1918); Hartray v. Chicago
Rys., 290 Ill. 85, 124 N. E. 849 (1919); Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v.
Chicago Rys., 307 Ill. 322, 138 N. E. 658 (1923). Unless the declaration
shows a timely action, it is bad even on motion in arrest. Hartray v.
Chicago Rys., supra, noted in (1920) 20 COL. L. Rnv. 225 and (1920) 29
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 572. See also North Side Sash & Door Co. v. Hecht,
295 Ill. 515, 129 N. E. 273 (1920). (foreclosure of mechanic's lien).
71 If the traditional history of the demurrer be true, it would seem that
originally all demurrers finally disposed of the controversy. The demur-
rant was given no opportunity to withdraw his demurrer and the opponent
was not permitted to amend; consequently, final judgment resulted from
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out the necessity of the parties entering into the expense, delay
and bitterness of the trial. Indeed, even if the demurrant does
not fully agree that the facts alleged by the opponent are true,
if the demurrer is sustained and the opponent feels that he
cannot consistently with truth state a better case, the demurrer
finally disposes of the controversy.
On the other hand, there are many instances in which the
demurrer does not and cannot dispose of the entire matter. In
the cases in which the pleader omits some items which he should
have alleged, or makes his statements in a manner condemned
by the law, or states a case which is legally sufficient but which
he cannot prove, the demurrer does not determine the merits
of the controversy but only the sufficiency or insufficiency of
the pleading itself. Most lawyers and judges will recognize that
the demurrer performs the latter function much more frequently
than it does the disposing function.72 Amendments are freely
permitted to-day and a party may remedy his insufficient plead-
ing without substantial penalty/3 The pleader is not precluded
from setting up, either in the first instance or by amendment, a
formally perfect but false set of facts. The demurrer of course
cannot usually74 determine the truth or falsity of the facts
and for this reason it usually performs the function of merely
securing legally sufficient pleadings. While there must be some
procedural devices to secure the observation of rules of plead-
ing,75 the demurrer is losing favor and the more flexible motion ,
is taking its place.
In New York the demurrer is abolished and is supplanted by
the motion to dismiss.77 The motion may be based on objections
every decision of the demurrer. If this ever was the law there can be no
doubt that comparatively early withdrawals and amendments were some-
times permitted ex gratia; later this came to be the general practice; and
now statutes almost universally provide that the parties are absolutely
entitled thereto.
72See Report of Special Co,rzittee to Su~ggest Rciacdies (1910) 35
A. B. A. REP. 638, 639.
73 See Rothschild, The Simplification of Civil Practice in Nlew Yord
(1923) 23 CoL. L. REV. 732, 747.
4 Occasionally a court will take judicial notice that an allegation in a
pleading is not true. Mlasline v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 95 Conn. 702,
112 Atl. 639 (1921); Taylor v. Barclay, 2 Sim. 213 (Ch. 1828).
75 Cf. 2 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY oF ENTGLISH LVw (1923) 251: "One of
the most difficult and one of the most permanent problems which a legal
system must face is a combination of a due regard for the claims of
substantial justice with a system of procedure rigid enough to be worlable."
76This is true in England, New Jersey, Michigan, New York and under
the Federal Equity Rules. Even in the many code jurisdictions the motion
to some extent supplants the special demurrer at common law. See, e.g.,
Kan. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1923) § 60-741.
7 C. P. A. § 277.
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appearing on the face of the complaint 78 and in this respect is
the approximate substitute of the demurrer. However, the mo-
tion is given a much broader effect than the demurrer. Rule 107
provides for motions based upon certain objections not appear-
ing on the face of the complaint.70 Such motions are supported
by affidavits to sustain one or more of the nine grounds of the
motion. The sixth ground is "that the cause of action did not
accrue within the time limited by law for the commencement of
an action thereon." The affidavits in support of the motion can
fix the time of the accrual of the cause of action either by a
positive reiteration of the allegation in the complaint or by show-
ing that some other date is the true one. The time of commence-
ment of the action can also be shown by affidavit or by refer-
ence to some court document, which perhaps could not techni-
cally be considered upon demurrer. If there is question con-
cerning whether the time is extended by virtue of some excep-
tion, this can be brought forth in the affidavits of the respective
parties.
Rule 108 provides that, in the discretion of the court, the mat-
ter may be disposed of (1) by the court upon the complaint and
affidavits filed by the parties, (2) by submitting the issue to a
jury or referee, or (3) by overruling the motion and permitting
78Rule 106.
79As to the proper nomenclature applicable to the various sorts of
motions under the present New York practice, see Rothschild, op. cit. supra
note 73, at 641. Dicta in some of the cases are to the effect that the alle-
gations of the complaint must be considered true for the purpose of disposal
of motions under Rule 107. Sly v. Van Lengen, 120 Misc. 420, 422, 198
N. Y. Supp. 608, 610 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Barnes v. Andrews, 208 App. Div.
856, 204 N. Y. Supp. 326, 327 (2d Dept. 1924); Keys v. Leopold, 213 App.
Div. 760, 761, 210 N. Y. Supp. 406, 408 (1st Dept. 1925), rev'd, 241 N. Y.
189, 149 N. E. 828 (1925). These statements would seem to be somewhat
misleading. Cf. Camp v. Reeves, 209 App. Div. 488, 494, 205 N. Y. Supp.
259, 264 (1st Dept. 1924). There can be no doubt but that a court may
base its decisiQn on data supplied by affidavit when the complaint is silent
upon the point. In addition it would be reasonable to adopt the version of
an affidavit which positively contradicts allegations of a complaint and is
not itself contradicted by counter-affidavit. The defense of the statute of
limitations can, it seems, be raised in a similar preliminary manner under
section 20 of the Pennsylvania Practice Act of 1915. Koons v. Philadelphia
& R. Ry., 281 Pa. 270, 126 At. 381 (1924); but see Prettyman v. Irwin,
273 Pa. 522, 117 Atl. 195 (1922). In Michigan the point cannot be raised
by motion because the new devise is said to be no broader than the de-
murrer under the former practice. Vyse v. Richards, supra note 52; San-
dusky Grain Co. v. Borden's Milk Co., 214 Mich 306, 183 N. W. 218 (1921).
It is interesting to note that these are equity cases. Formerly, Michigan
held that the statute of limitations could in equity be raised by demurrer.
Campau v. Chene, supra note 51; see Highstone v. Franks, 93 Mich. 52, 57,
52 N. W. 1015, 1016, 1017 (1892). In this respect the new motion has
been given even a narrower effect than the demurrer in the earlier prac-
tice in Michigan.
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the objection to be incorporated in the answer and determined
at the trial. For the purpose of expedition of the action and the
saving of expense, the first alternative is preferred to the others
and probably the second to the third. Which alternative vill
be chosen by a court will depend largely upon the clearness of
the showing or the extent to which the parties agree concerning
the facts. If there is serious controversy over them, a court
should not dispose of this important matter upon affidavits.r
However, if the reported cases are representative, it would seem
that most of the cases can be disposed of by the court. More
often than not there is no real disagreement between the par-
ties as to the pertinent facts with reference to the period of
limitation.8 ' Often the plaintiff files no counter-affidavits, evi-
dently because he is unable to dispute the defendant's claim. If
differences exist as to points of law, these can be determined
more advantageously at the motion stage than at the trial as un-
der the former practice. The present New York procedure does
not require the plaintiff to follow the practice of anticipating the
defense of the statute of limitations by showing his case to be
within one of the exceptionsC2 The whole manner of treatment
seems to be a great economy for, if the motion is granted, it or-
so Sly v. Van Lengen, supra note 79; United States v. Scudder, 2 Fed.
(2d) 632 (E. D. N. Y. 1924); United States v. Connors, 295 Fed. 521 (E.
D. N. Y. 1923). See also Rizzuto v. United States Shipping Board E. F.
Corp., 213 App. Div. 326, 210 N. Y. Supp. 482 (2d Dept. 1925); Herzog v.
Brown, 217 App. Div. 402, 216 N. Y. Supp. 134 (1st Dept. 1926).
Sl Stern v. Auerbach, 203 App. Div. 681, 197 N. Y. Supp. 295 (1st Dept.
1922); Koerner v. Apple, 120 Misc. 266, 199 N. Y. Supp. 171 (Sup. Ct.
1923); Johnson v. Guernsey, 208 App. Div. 548, 203 N. Y. Supp. 781 (4th
Dept. 1924); Bykowsky v. Public Nat'l Bank, 209 App. Div. 61, 204
N. Y. Supp. 385 (1st Dept. 1924), af'd 240 N. Y. 555, 148 N. E. 702
(1925) ; Camp v. Reeves, 209 App. Div. 488, 205 N. Y. Supp. 259 (1st Dept.
1924) ; Peters v. Wells Fargo & Co., 211 App. Div. 772, 207 N. Y. Supp.
657 (1st Dept. 1925); Keys v. Leopold, supra note 79; Dumbadze v. Lig-
nante, 216 App. Div. 554, 215 N. Y. Supp. 442 (1st Dept. 1920). See,
generally, s.pra notes 2-12. The proceeding by motion is not mandatory
and may be taken by answer. Gentilala v. Fay Taxicabs, Inc., 214 App.
Div. 255, 212 N. Y. Supp. 101 (1st Dept. 1925), aff'd on this point in 243 N.
Y. 397, 153 N. E. 848 (1926). In several instances, counsel for the defen-
dant has chosen to raise the point by answer, though it appears that the
motion might possibly have been a more expeditious means. Stuart v.
Grattan, 217 App. Div. 336, 216 N. Y. Supp. 727 (3d Dept. 1926) ; Schochet
v. Public Nat'l Bank, 127 Misc. 447, 216 N. Y. Supp. 162 (Sup. Ct. 192G);
Backus v. Severn, 127 Misc. 776, 216 N. Y. Supp. 381 (Sup. Ct. 192);
Laurencelle v. Laurencelle, 217 App. Div. 159, 216 N. Y. Supp. 384 (2d
Dept. 1926). Often defendants desire to answer and raise the defense of
the statute by a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Harmon v. Alfred
Peats Co., 243 N. Y. 473, 154 N. E. 314 (1926) ; Guerin v. Guerin, 127 Misc.
745, 217 N. Y. Supp. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
82 It will be noted that in the jurisdictions which permit the statute of
limitations to be raised on demurrer, the plaintiff will be required to plead
his exceptions in his first pleading in order to have it demurrer-proof. See
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dinarily disposes of the entire controversy, The result is
reached sooner and with far less strain on the participants than
if raised by answer and determined at trial.
In many types of contractual actions, certain jurisdictions
permit summary judgment to be entered for the plaintiff upon
the defendant's failure, due opportunity having been given him,
to show that there are matters to be litigated. This gives to
the plaintiff a remedy for the procrastinating practices of debt-
ors. Defendants should have a similar protection against the
nuisance of a pending unwarranted lawsuit. Often defendants,
as well as plaintiffs, wish to have the matter disposed of as soon
as possible. The constitutionality of Rules 107 and 108 does
not seem to have been questioned directly in New York. They
surely do not deprive a plaintiff of the constitutional right to
trial by jury any more than summary judgment proceedings.2
In cases of real conflict of evidence the court should not decide
the case upon affidavit, and by doing so may in a given case
violate the Constitution. But a useful procedural device should
not be scrapped merely because conceivably it might result in
abuses. These two rules seem to be among the most admirable
features of the present New York procedure. Under them not
only the statute of limitations but the defenses of the statute of
frauds, res adjudicata, another action pending, release, incapa-
city and lack of jurisdiction can be raised and disposed of at an
early stage of the case without the necessity of a trial. Indeed
many other defenses could well be raised in this way if the rules
permitted.8 5  The practice is not without ancient precedent, for
it is quite similar to the Roman exceptio and to the plea in
supra notes 36, 47, 57. At common law such anticipation was not only
unnecessary but improper. Gunton v. Hughes, supra note 35.
83 Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 73, at 646, (1924) 24 COL. L. REv., at
863, 870; Finch, Summary Judgments Under the Civil Practice Act in
New Yorkc (1924) 49 A. B. A. REP. 588; McCall, Summary Judgment Under
New York Rules (1924) 10 A. B. A. J. 22; Rothschild, New York Civil
Practice Simplified (1926) 26 COL. L. Rnv. 30, 53. See also (1922) 22 COL.
L. REv. 483; (1923) 23 CoL. L. REv. 496; (1925) 25 CoL. L. Rv. 678.
In addition to England and New York, the summary judgment is in use
in Arkansas, Michigan, New Jersey, Illinois and the District of Columbia.
84 See articles and notes supra note 83 for a discussion of the constitu-
tionality of the summary judgment proceeding and constitutional limita-
tions on its use. The constitutionality of Rule 107 has been generally
assumed. See authorities supra note 81. Constitutional dangers of refus-
ing trial by jury when serious questions of fact exist are mentioned in
Herzog v. Brown, supra note 80, at 136. See also Rothschild, New York
Civil Practice Simplified (1926) 26 COL. L. Rav. 30, 52.
85 Possibly payment, validity of contract and the constitutionality of the
law upon which the plaintiff bases his right of action could be raised by
motion. Probably the question of contributory negligence could not, due
to differences between the parties as to the facts in such cases and the
closely intermingled question of the defendant's negligence.
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equity, which was designed to obviate the necessity of an an-
swer with its accompanying discovery.G
The great advantage of the New York motion is that it per-
mits undisputed facts to be used by the comt at an early stage
of the case, in order to dispose of the case finally because of
the bar of the statute of limitations. To a lesser degree this is
true of the demurrer but the court can consider only such facts
as are pleaded. Under the New York practice, the plaintiff has
ample notice of the defense and of the facts upon which the de-
fendant relies to sustain it. If the point is raised by demurrer,
theoretically the plaintiff needs no notice, as only the factual data
contained in his own pleading and other documents in the court
files will be considered. But it is reasonable to insist that notice
of the defendant's legal theory of the demurrer be given because:
(1) the plaintiff may be able to amend consistently with truth
and prevent a useless argument and decision upon the demurrer;
(2) the plaintiff may be willing to confess judgment without
argument as soon as he comprehends the defendant's theory; (3)
the plaintiff's counsel should be given an opportunity to investi-
gate the questions of law involved and prepare his argument
thereon for the trial court. For these reasons a general demur-
rer should not be permitted to raise the point. Most jurisdic-
tions which recognize the demurrer as a proper procedural de-
vice to raise the statute of limitations insist that it be a special
demurrer.87
RAISING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BY ANSWER
1. U-ne? a Denial. Even under the present procedure in
New York it will not always be possible to dispose of the de-
fense of the statute of limitations before the trial stage of the
litigation. Furthermore, in the states which more or less gen-
erally permit the point to be asserted by demurrer, there will
be frequent occasions when a demurrer is not applicable. For
example, there will be cases in which the date of accrual of the
cause of action is not mentioned at all 8" or in which the plain-
86 2 POLLOCK & AITLA!D, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw (1911) 611.
S7 See text supra at notes 53, 54; LANGDELL, op. cit. svupra note 38, §§ 93,
98; Herzog v. Brown, supra note 80, at 135.
88 See Holdorf v. Holdorf, 185 Iowa, 838, 169 N. W. 737 (1918). In
jurisdictions which ordinarily allow a demurrer to raise the question (sapra
notes 57, 60) when no date of accrual is alleged in the complaint, the
point must be raised by answer. Pleasant v. Samuels, 114 Calif. 34, 45
Pac. 998 (1896); Pike v. Zadig, 1"71 Calif. 273, 152 Pac. 923 (1915);
Osborn v. Portsmouth Nat'l Bank, 61 Ohio St. 427, 56 N. E. 197 (1900);
Hawkins v. Donnerberg, 40 Or. 97, 66 Pac. 691, 908 (1901). But if the
timely commencement of a statutory action is deemed a condition precedent,
the omission to allege the time of accrual may be ground for demurrer.
Hartray v. Chicago Rys., supra note 70. See also supra note 64.
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tiff alleges a time within the statutory period, which fact the
defendant wishes to contest. In these situations, and generally
in the jurisdictions which do not permit a demurrer to raise the
question,89 the bar of the statute should be asserted by plea or
answer.
There are some situations in which a defendant has been
permitted to raise the point at the trial under the general issue
or general denial. For example, Lord Holt 00 believed that the
wording of the general issue in debt, "he does not owe," was so
broad that it would permit the defense of the statute of limita-
tions to be raised by merely pleading the general issue, but the
prevailing view seems to be to the contrary.W. In penal actions,
most courts 92 have permitted the bar to be asserted at the trial
after a mere denial of the indebtedness. This position was
originally due to an express statutory provision 3 in England
and has been followed in this country regardless of the absence
of such a statute. There are a number of miscellaneous situa-
tions " in which the statute of limitations has been held to be
properly raised at the trial without expressly pleading it.
89 Stair v. Gilbert, 209 Ky. 243, 272 S. W. 732 (1925); Hodgdon v.
Haverhill, 193 Mass. 327, 79 N. E. 818 (1907); Sawyer v. Boston, 144
Mass. 470, 11 N. E. 711 (1887); First Nat'l Bank v. Steel, 136 Mich.
588, 99 N. W. 786 (1904); Townshop of Forest v. American Bonding Co.,
180 Mich. 90, 146 N. W. 416 (1914); Sullivan v. Portland Ry., 94 U. S. 806
(1877). Thus, when one defendant pleads the statute of limitations, benefit
of the statute should not be given to other defendants. Emory v. Keighan, 94
Ill. 543 (1880) ; Fish v. Farwell, 160 Ill. 236, 43 N. E. 367 (1895) ; West v.
Williams & Sons, 202 Ky. 382, 259 S. W. 1015 (1924); Moran v. Midland
Farms Co., 282 S. W. 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926). See also cases cited
supra notes 19, 27, 35, 36, 55, 60, 63. It is not necessary, however, to
plead presumption of payment after twenty years. Chesapeake & Dela-
ware Canal Co. v. United States, 223 Fed. 926 (C. C. A. 3d, 1915).
9OAnonymous, 1 Salk. 278 (N. P. 1690); Draper v. Glassop, 1 Ld.
Raym. 153 (K. B. 1697). Ace.: Hogan v. Sims, 1 Brev. 76 (S. C. 1802).
o1 Chapple v. Durston, 1 Cr. & J. 1 (Ex. 1830); Gardner v. Lindo, Fed.
Cas. No. 5231 (C. C. D. C. 1802); MlcIver v. Moore, Fed. Cas. No. 8831
(C. C. D. C. 1802); see Smart v Baugh, 3 J. J. Marsh, 363 (Ky. 1830);
Butcher v. Hixton, 4 Leigh, 519, 527 (Va. 1833).
92Watson v. Anderson, Hardin, 458 (Ky. 1808); Moore v. Smith, 5
Greenl. 490 (Me. 1829); Pike v. Jenkins, 12 N. H. 255 (1841); Gebbart v.
Adams, supra note 27. But see Western Union Telegraph Co. v. State,
82 Ark. 309, 101 S. W. 748 (1907).
93 (1623) 21 Jac. I, c. 4, § 4 specifically provided that when a person
is sued in a penal action he may plead the general issue and give special
matter in evidence. Rhode Island has a similar statute. R. I. Gen. Laws
(1923) § 6420. Even aside from such provisions, it is possible to recon-
cile the decisions on the traditional line of reasoning that as the same
statute "created," both the right and the limitation, the bringing of the
suit within the limitation is a condition precedent to recovery. See supra
notes 64-69 and infr'a note 105, and Petrie v. White, 3 T. R. 5, 11 (K.
B. 1789).
94 It has been held that when the declaration or complaint shows that
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In the great majority of jurisdictions, a plaintiff who relies
upon adverse possession for the statutory period, need not assert
the bar of the statute as the source of his "title" but may merely
plead generically that he is the owner20 Consequently if the
the action is barred, the statute of limitations can be insisted upon although
not asserted by either answer or demurrer. Robinson v. Lewis, 45 N. C.
58 (1853); Atwood Mercantile Co. v. Rooney, 114 Kan. 340, 220 Pae.
1048 (1923). There are frequent dicta to this general effect. Eayrz
v. Mlason, 54 Neb. 143, 74 N. W. 408 (1898); Easton Nat'l Bank v.
American Brick Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 732, 64 Atl. 917 (1906); see also Holland
r. Tjosevig, 109 Wash. 142, 1S6 Pac. 317 (1919). But this position is
generally rejected. Thompson v. Parker, 68 Ala. 387 (1880); Jennings
v. Rickard, 10 Colo. 395, 15 Pac. 677 (1887); Brickett v. Davis, 21 Picl:.
404 (Mass. 1838); Schmitt v. Hager, 88 Mlinn. 410, 93 N. W. 110 (1903);
State v. Spence, s.pra note 57; Wilkinson v. Flowers, 37 Bliss. 579 (1859) ;
Vore v. Woodford, 29 Ohio St. 245 (1876) ; see Trebby v. Simmons, 38 Minn.
508, 38 N. W. 693 (1888). There are a number of situations in which
the statute of limitations can be insisted upon without pleading it because
there -was no opportunity to plead it, viz., generally, Emory v. Keighan,
supra note 89; Purcell v. Wilson, 4 Gratt. 16 (Va. 1847); Martin v. Coch-
ran, 94 W. Va. 432, 119 S. E. 174 (1923); Dreutzer -. Baher, CO Wic.
179, 18 N. W. 776 (1884) (no special replication allowed to a set-off);
Kincade v. Peck, 193 Mich. 207, 159 N. W. 480 (1916); Woodland Oil
Co. v. Byers, 223 Pa. 241, 72 At. 518 (1909); Williams v. Perry, 2 Strob.
170 (S. C. 1847); Sexton & Co. v. Aultman & Co., 92 Va. 20, 22 S. E.
838 (1895); see Stiles v. Laurel Fork Oil & Coal Co., 47 W. Va. 338, 34,
35 S. E. 986, 988 (1900) (no formal pleadings as in probate proceedings
etc.); Pendley v. Powers, 129 Ga. 69, 58 S. E. 653 (1907); Bromwell v.
Bromwell, 139 Ill. 424, 28 N. E. 1057 (1891); Reynolds v. Lansford, 16
Tex. 286 (1856); Bartlett v. Tufts, 241 Mass. 96, 134 N. E. 630 (1922).
But see (generally) Sloanaker v. Howerton, 182 Iowa, 487, 166 N. W. 78
(1918). Where the interests of third persons (beneficiaries and creditors)
are involved, personal representatives should not be permitted to waive the
defense. Hence it seems sound for the court to notice the defense of
limitations, although it is not pleaded, for the vitally interested parties
have not an opportunity to do so. Martin v. Estate of Martin, 103 Wis.
284, 84 N. W. 439 (1900); Murtha v. Donohoo, 149 Wis. 481, 104 N. W.
406 (1912); Mann v. Redmon, 23 N. D. 508, 137 N. W. 473 (1912);
Branch v. Lambert, 103 Or. 423, 205 Pac. 995 (1922); see Stebbins v.
Scott, 172 Blass. 356, 52 N. E. 535 (1899). The same reasoning could
be applied to suits against the United States. Finn v. United States, 123
U. S. 227, 8 Sup. Ct. 82 (1887). If the defendant is misled as to the
nature of the plaintiff's cause of action he has been permitted to have
the advantage of the statute without pleading it. Gottschall v. Blelsing,
2 Nev. 185 (1866); Tazewell v. Whittle, 13 Gratt. 329 (Va. 1856). In
special cases, statutes sometimes permit any matter to be raiked under
the general issue. Mliss. Ann. Code (Hemingway, 1917) § 1765; Pa. Stat.
(1920) §§ 17179-17192. When the effect of the statute of limitations is
only to mitigate the damages, it may be shown under the general issuo
or denial. Thompson v. Holbert, 109 N. Y. 329, 16 N. E. 675 (183);
Slocum v. Riley, 145 Mlass. 370, 14 N. E. 174 (18S7). This position is no
doubt a heritage of the common law insistence upon a single issue. It
is doubtful whether the New York court should so hold under the Civil
Practice Act. See infra note 110.
95 Gillespie v. Jones, 47 Calif. 259 (1874) ; Montecito Valley Water Co. v.
935
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defendant, who was the initial owner, denies the plaintiff's title
by a general or special denial, he can show that the statute of
limitations has not run and that the plaintiff has not "title" by
adverse possession. This position is firmly established and
there can be little hope of change. These holdings result from
the traditional ideas (1) that "title" is an ultimate fact in
pleading,97 and (2) that the adverse possessor for the statutory
period has "title." 8 For many purposes, this manner of think-
ing and speaking is convenient but it must be remembered that
the regarding of title as something real and a priori instead of
a mere shorthand expression to denote a more or less definite
number of legal relationships may lead to serious inaccuracie*
or even absurdities. 9 There is also the more frequent situation
in which a defendant claims title by adverse possession against
the plaintiff, the original owner. Under the prevailing rule the
defendant may raise the statute of limitations by any form of
denial which puts the "title" in issue,100 but some jurisdictions
Santa Barbara, 144 Calif. 578, 77 Pac. 1113 (1904); Nash v. Northwest
Land Co., 15 N. D. 566, 108 N. W. 792 (1906); Laclede Land & Imp. Co.
v. Epright, 265 Mo. 210, 177 S. W. 386 (1915); Mascall v. Murray, 76
Or. 637, 149 Pac. 517 (1915); Donahue v. Thompson, 60 Wis. 500, 19
N. W. 520 (1884); Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 122 Wash. 514,
210 Pac. 770 (1922). See also Sullivan v. Dunphy, 4 Mont. 499, 2 Pac.
284 (1882); Frierson v. Irwin, 5 La. Ann. 531 (1850). Contra: Erp v.
Tillman, 103 Tex. 574, 131 S. W. 1057 (1910) (under a peculiar statute);
Hunnicut v. Brydson, 274 S. W. 1015 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
96 See Donahue v. Thompson, supra note 95.
97 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 290, 291. But it is not improper
to specify the manner of acquiring title by adverse possession. Patchett v.
Webber, 198 Calif. 440, 245 Pac. 422 (1926); Duckworth v. Duckworth,
144 N. C. 620, 57 S. E. 396 (1907); Rasmussen v. Winters, 82 Or. 674, 162
Pac. 849 (1917).
98 Atkinson, op. cit. supra note 9, at 173.
99 Cf. Chafee, Rights in Overdue Paper (1918) 31 HARV. L. REV. 1104.
100 Smith v. Bachus, 195 Ala. 8, 70 So. 261 (1915); Stevens v. Smoker,
84 Conn. 560, 80 Atl. 788 (1911); Osceola Fertilizer Co. v. Beville, 86
Fla. 479, 98 So. 354 (1923); Coward v. Coward, 148 Ill. 268, 35 N. E. 759
(1893); Brown v. Fodder, 81 Ind. 491 (1882) (statute); Wiggins v. Powell,
96 Kan. 478, 152 Pac. 765 (1915); Asher v. Howard, 122 Ky. 175, 91 S. W,
270 (1906); Miller v. Beck, 68 Mich. 76, 35 N. W. 899 (1888); Dean v.
Tucker, 58 Miss. 487 (1880) (statute permits no special plea); Hedges
v. Pollard, 149 Mo. 216, 50 S. W. 889 (1899); Murray v. Romine, 60 Neb.
94, 82 N. W. 318 (1900); Fleming v. Sexton, 172 N. C. 250, 90 S. E. 247
(1916); Rhodes v. Gunn, 35 Ohio St. 387 (1880); Smith v. Algona Lum-
ber Co., 73 Or. 1, 136 Pac. 7, 143 Pac. 921 (1914); Way v. Hooton, 156
Pa. 8, 26 Atl. 784 (1893); Lloyd v. Rawl, 63 S. C. 219, 41 S. E. 312
(1902); Southern Iron Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S. W. 785
(1911); Pillow v. Roberts, 13 How. 472 (U. S. 1851); Hogan v. Kurtz,
94 U. S. 773 (1876); see McArthur v. Clark, 86 Minn. 165, 90 N. W. 369
(1902). For a review of the English cases, the origin of the rule and
the reasoning supporting it, see Atkinson op. cit. supra note 9, at 171,
et seq. The foregoing cases have to do with land. The same rule seems
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require the defendant to plead the statute specially.',
There is still another group of cases in which the courts gen-
erally permit the question of limitation of time to be raised under
a general denial. This is the class already noticed 2 in which
the limitation is fixed by the same statutes which "created" the
light, sometimes summarized as ones in which the limitation
is said to bar the right as well as the remedy.0 3 From the sub-
stantive law standpoint or, in other words, considering the oper-
ative facts as properly pleaded and shown, there seems to be
no difference between the effect of the required lapse of time
under the general statute of limitations and the special limita-
tion provision of the statutory actions. In both cases the effect
is to prevent the plaintiff's recovery. The principal differences
are the procedural ones here in question, viz., as to the assertion
of the point by demurrer or by general denial, and the matter
of burden of proof.04 To say that the limitations of the special
statutory actions bar the right as well as the remedy is not a
reason for the different procedural treatment but an avkward
announcement of the position that a difference will be made. As
has already been indicated, the writer has searched for a satis-
factory reason for this distinction and has failed to find one.
Yet for the most part the courts have not required the defense
to be specially pleaded in these cases, 02 while they ordinarily
require it with respect to the general statute of limitations.
to apply with reference to chattels. Traun v. Keiffer, 31 .4a. 136 (1857);
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 Ark. 650 (1858); Smart v. Baugh, suepra note 91;
Elam v. Bass, 4 Munf. 301 (Va. 1814). A different rule is said to be unfair
as the plaintiff who claims by adverse possession may plead his title
generally. Asher v. Howard, supra.
1"1 McCreery v. Duane, 52 Calif. 262 (1877); Empire Ranch & Cattle
Co. v. Howell, 23 Colo. App. 265, 129 Pac. 245 (1912); Luen v. Wilson,
85 Ky. 503, 3 S. W. 911 (1887) ; Hansee v. Mead, 27 Hun, 162 (N. Y. Sup.
Ct. 1882); Northwestern Mortgage Trust Co. v. Schatz, sup7a note 63;
Burk v. Turner, 79 Tex. 276, 15 S. W. 256 (1891); Brown v. Haley, 5G
Wash. 218, 105 Pac. 478 (1909); Orton v. Noonan, 25 Wis. 072 (1870);
see McKewen v. Allen, 80 Ark. 181, 96 S. W. 392 (1906); State v. Quantic,
37 Mont. 32, 94 Pac. 491 (1908). Some of these are evidently overruled by
later cases. See supra notes 95, 100. The statutes supra note 61 providing
that the statute of limitations can be raised only by answer are largely
responsible for these decisions. But these statutes do not seem to compel
all courts to require special pleading of the defense of title by adverse
possession. See North Carolina, Oregon and South Carolina cases, -upia
note 100.
102 See supra notes 64 to 70.
103 See supra note 65.
.04 As to demurrer, see supra notes 69, 70. Of course there is the dif-
ference of the presence of exceptions. See supra notes 68-70. See also
infra note 112.
105 Louisville Ry. v. Echols, 203 Ala. 627, 84 So. 827 (1919); McRae
v. New York Ry., 199 Mass. 418, 85 N. E. 425 (1908); Cole v. Coon, 70
Miss. 634, 12 So. 849 (1893); Shattuck v. Guardian Trust Co., 204 N. Y.
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2. By Confession and Avoidance. On the whole there is a
tendency of recent legislation and case law to prevent the asser-
tion of the defense of limitation of time at the trial under a gen-
eral denial. There has been no pronounced rush in this direc-
tion, nor any sudden abandonment of former practices. But the
current tends this way, largely because of our present empha-
sis upon the notice function of pleading.100 The English rules of
court were among the earliest influences in this regard. Rule
15 of Order XIX provides that matters which are likely to take
the opposite party by surprise should be specially pleaded, and
this general statement is followed by the enumeration of par-
ticular matters which should be alleged. Among these is the
defense of the statute of limitations. The English provision is
followed substantially in Connecticut,0 " Michigan, o8 New Jer-
sey,10 9 and New York.110 In addition, a number of code juris-
dictions have statutes "I to the effect that the defense must be
asserted by answer. Such legislative declarations have not
caused the courts to depart entirely and suddenly from the "title
by adverse possession" and the "right as well as remedy barred"
grooves, in which a denial has traditionally raised the point."m
Worshippers of the concept of title and of issue pleading will
continue to tread the old paths. Those who insist that notice
is the primary object of pleading will require special notice of
the defense to be given. Decisions continue to follow the course
of the old grooves but the foregoing provisions have already
made some impression 13 and their future effect may be much
greater.
The approved plea of the statute of limitations at common law
was that "the cause of action did not accrue within x years be-
fore the commencement of this suit." 114 There might be said to
200, 97 N. E. 517 (1912); King v. Mayor of Butte, supra note 69; Atlan-
tic Coast Line Ry. v. Burnette, 239 U. S. 199, 36 Sup. Ct. 75 (1915); see
Tutsch v. Director General of Railroads, 52 Calif. App. 650, 199 Pac,
861 (1921).
100 Clark, History Systems and Functions of Pleading (1925) 11 VA. L.
REv. 517, 544.
107 Conn. Prac. Book (1922) § 200.
108 Circuit Court Rule 23, § 2.
109 Court Rule 40.
110 C. P. A. § 242.
111 See supra ndte 61.
112 See supra notes 95-105. These so-called "grooves" are not confined
to the field of pleading and procedure but are well established in other
fields, e.g., conflict of laws, Davis v. Mills, 194 U. S. 451, 24 Sup. Ct. 692
(1904); constitutional law (1926) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 478. There
has probably been an interaction and mutual supporting process between
the decisions in the different fields. See Atkinson, op. cit. supra note 9,
at 174, 175.
113 See supra note 101.
114 CHITTY, PLEADING *941; Wallace v. Schaub, 81 Md. 594, 32 Atl. 324
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be three elements in this plea, viz., (1) the date of the accrual of
the action; (2) the date of the commencement of the action; (1)
th6 time intervening between (1) and (2). This allegation was
deemed to be in the approved form of "ultimate fact," avoiding
the taint of being too specific matter of "evidence" on the one
hand and too general "conclusion of law" on the other.21 It had
all the currency and orthodoxy, which constant usage and the
form books could give. There was no need for the defendant to
allege the dates upon which he claimed that the cause of action
accrued or the suit was commenced. Such allegations would be
bad at common law because they might lead to taking issue upon
a particular time which would be immaterial.
Substantially the common law form of plea is approved under
the code and other modern practice." The more generic form
that "the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations"
has been usually held bad, 17 although it has sometimes been sus-
tained.", This manner of pleading is given express statutory
sanction in several jurisdictions when coupled with a specifica-
tion of the section of the statute which fixes the limitation upon
which the pleader relies."1 By reference, this points out the
(1895); Atkinson v. Winters, 47 W. Va. 226, 34 S. E. 834 (1S99). See
the excellent comment by Professor Millar in (1916) 11 ILL. L. flnV. 50. See,
however, the doctrine that this form of plea is insufficient unless the
declaration or complaint shows that the limitation pleaded is applicable.
Lyon v. Bertram, 20 How. 149 (U. S. 1857); Alexander v. Bryan, 110 U.
S. 414, 4 Sup. Ct. 107 (1884) and cases i 2fra note 131. In equity, any
answer which shows an intention to rely on the statute of limitations
is sufficient to raise the defense. Rohrabacher v. Walsh, 170 lich. 59, 135
N. W. 907 (1912) ; Tazewell v. Whittle, supra note 94; Talbott v. Wood-
ford, 48 W. Va. 449, 37 S. E. 5S0 (1900).
"15 See Cook, Statements of Fact in Plcadbzg Undcr the Code (1921) 21
COL. L. REv. 416.
316 Sweet v. Barnard, 66 Colo. 526, 182 Pac. 22 (1919); Bell v. Yates,
33 Barb. 627 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1861); Senrls v. Knapp, 5 S. D. 325, 58 N.
W. 807 (1894); see Franklin v. Southern Pacific Co., 40 Calif. App. 31,
180 Pac. 76 (1919); Walker v. Laney, 27 S. C. 150, 3 S. E. 63 (1887).
In particular situations more specific allegations are required. Sammis v
Wightman, 31 Fla. 10, 12 So. 526 (1893); Neill v. Burke, 81 Neb. 123,
115 N. W. 321 (1908); Lyon v. Bertram and Alexander v. Bryan, czelwa
note 114; New York cases cited infra note 131.
" 1Southern Pac. Co. v. Santa Cruz, 26 Calif. App. 20,145 Pac. 736 (1014);
Scroggin v. Nat'l Lumber Co. 41 Neb. 195, 59 N. W. 548 (1894); Pope v.
Andrews, 90 N. C. 401 (1884); Walker v. Laney, supra note 110; Spanish
Fork City v. Hopper, 7 Utah, 235, 26 Pac. 293 (1891).
218 Louis Werner Sawmill Co. v Dyer, 132 Ark. 78, 200 S. W. 281 (1917);
Ministerial & School Fund v. Rowell, 49 Me. 330 (180). Other jurisdic-
tions hold this form of answer sufficient if the complaint shows that the
action was barred. Lilly v. Farmers Nat'l Bank, 22 Ky. L. R. 148, 56
S. W. 722 (1900); Litch v. Bryant, 46 Colo. 160, 103 Pac. 289 (1909). See
also equity cases supra note 114.
1% Calif. Code Civ. Proc. (1915) § 458; Idaho Comp. Stat. (1919) § 6713;
Mont. Rev. Codes (Choate, 1921) § 9173; Utah Comp. Laws (1917) § 6C02;
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period which is claimed to be a bar. The only respect in which
it is less specific than the common law is that the word "barred"
assumes that the measurement of time is between the date of
the accrual of the cause of action and the date of the commence-
ment of suit. This is such an elementary point that the statu-
tory form seems unobjectionable and, to the lawyer at least, gives
as much notice as the common law precedent. Too minute state-
ments of fact are not desirable because they tend either to tie
the pleader down to inconsequential matters 120 or to mislead the
opponent as to what the real issue will be. For this reason, as
at common law, the defendant should not be required to allege
the particular dates of the accrual of the cause of action and of
the commencement of suit.
It is generally held unnecessary for the defendant to point out
in his answer the section of the statute of limitations upon
which he relies.12' It seems quite proper to do so and, as already
stated, there are sometimes express statutes 122 permitting this
form of answer. Such answers seem capable of serving the
notice-giving function satisfactorily. While the rule of law re-
lied upon is generally an unpleaded major premise, still the op-
ponent's knowledge of one's legal theory is of substantial aid
in avoiding surprises, misconceptions and absence of testimony
at the trial. On the other hand, there is some danger in this
practice, for the tendency may be to prevent the defendant from
having the advantage of any other section than the one he has
pleaded. This matter can be treated reasonably. The problem
is one which arises very often in pleading, viz., to require allega-
tions sufficiently specific to be useful from the standpoint of no-
tice and at the same time general enough to allow a pleader suffi-
cient leeway to avoid the consequences of slight initial miscon-
ceptions of fact or law. If the defendant has pleaded one limita-
tion provision, he should not be precluded from relying upon a
shorter limitation which is applicable.223 Even in the reverse
Porto Rico Rev. Stat. Codes (Comp. 1911) § 5112. But the statutory method
is not exclusive and the matter can evidently be pleaded according to
the common law form. Franklin v. Southern Pac. Co., 40 Calif. App. 31,
180 Pac. 76 (1919). But it is not sufficient to merely allege that the action
is barred by the statute of limitations. See California and Utah cases,
supra note 117.
120 See comment by Professor Clark in (1923) 32 YALE LAW SouaNAL,
483, passim.
121 Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Paige, 178, 197 (N. Y. Ch. 1833);
Van Hook v. Whitlock, 7 Paige, 373 (N. Y. Ch. 1839); Meade v. Gilfoyle,
64 Wis. 18, 24 N. W. 413 (1885); Harpending v. Reformed Church, 16
Pet. 455 (U. S. 1842) ; Waller v. Texas & P. Ry, 229 Fed. 87 (C. C. A. 2d,
1915). See also supra notes 114, 116 and Franklin v. Southern Pac. Co.,
supra note 119.
122 Supra note 119.
123 Two problems must be carefully distinguished: (1) is a plea, which
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situation, where the limitation insisted upon at the trial is
longer than the one pleaded, 2 1 the test of prejudice to the oppo-
nents should be applied before precluding the pleader. Even if
the opponent has been misled, an amendment should be per-
mitted with a continuance at the pleader's cost.12 Fear of the
inconvenience and expense of a continuance will ordinarily cause
care in pleading a proper statutory provision, while disinclination
to postpone a trial already commenced will tend to prevent a
feigned claim of surprise.
The plea of the statute of limitations is usually regarded as
one of confession and avoidance or of new matter.12 Thus all
sets up a longer period of limitation than is applicable, good against de-
murrer? This is generally answered in the negative. Snith v. Joyce,
10 Ark. 460 (1850); Murphy v. Park Ridge, 298 Il. 66, 131 N. E. 256
(1921); Axton v. Carter, 141 Ind. 672, 39 N. E. 546 (1895); Boyd v.
Barrenger, 23 Miss. 269 (1852); Riggs v. Quick, 16 N. J. L. 160 (1837);
Blackmore v. Tidderly, 2 Salk. 423 (K. B. 1704). Indications to the
contrary can be found, however. Boyd v. Blankman, 29 Calif. 19 (1865);
MeCray v. Humes, 116 Ind. 103, 18 N. E. 500 (1888); Sargeant v. John-
son, McCord, 336 (S. C. 1821); Macfadzen v. Olivant, 0 East, 3S7 (K. B.
1805); McCormick v. Higgins, 190 Ill. App. 241 (1914). (2) If no de-
murrer is filed, should a plea of a longer limitation than is applicable per-
mit proof of a shorter one? Most courts answer this in the affirmative.
Boyd v. Blankman, supra; McCormick v. Higgins, supra; Van Hool: v.
Whitlock, supra note 121; Reilly v. Sabater, 26 Civ. Proc. R. 34, 43 N. Y.
Supp. 383 (1896); Camp v. Smith, 136 N. Y. 187, 32 N. E. 640 (1892);
Schneider v. Schneider, 118 S. W. 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909);, Martin v.
Burr, 111 Tex. 57, 228 S. W. 543 (1921); Davidson v. Wright, 233 S. W.
108, 236 S. W. 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Morgan v. Bishop, 61 Wis.
407, 21 N. W. 263 (1884) ; Roberts v. Decker, 120 Wis. 102, 97 N. W. 519
(1903); Phelps v. Elliott, 35 Fed. 455 (C. C. N. Y. 1838); Ramsden v.
Gately, 142 Fed. 912 (C. C. N. Y. 1906). But see Blakely v. Ft. Lyon
Canal Co., 31 Colo. 224, 73 Pac. 249 (1903). When a defendant gives
notice that he will show that the action was not commenced within ten
years, there is ordinarily no surprise in the showing that the action was
not commenced within six years. But it is conceivable that an opponent
may be misled as to the legal theory and on that account entitled to a
continuance.
324 Here the courts quite uniformly hold that the defendant does not
raise the longer limitation by pleading the shorter one. Downey v. Atchi-
son, T. & S. F. R. R., 60 Kan. 499, 57 Pac. 101 (1899); Grigsby v. Morris,
89 Kan. 758, 132 Pac. 1001 (1913); Bridgforth v. Payne, 62 Miss. 777
(1885); Hunter v. Hunter, 50 Mo. 445 (1872); Bruce v. Baxter, 75 Tenn.
477 (18S1); Puckle v. Moor, 1 Vent. 191 (K. B. 1684). Of courze, in such
case, a demurrer would be properly sustained to the plea or answer. Corn-
well v. Broom, 34 Ill. App. 391 (1889); Ashbey v. Ashbey, 38 La. Ann.
902 (1886); Conowingo Land Co. v. McGaw, 124 Md. 643, 93 Atl. 222
(1915); see Burstein v. Levy, 49 Misc. 469, 98 N. Y. Supp. 853 (Sup.
Ct. 1906).
125 See Bruce v. Baxter, supra note 124. See Pound, The Caaon of
Procedural Reform (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 541, 544.
2 6Adams v. Tucker, 6 Colo. App. 393, 40 Pac. 783 (1895); Central
Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., svpra note 27; Emmons v. Hay-
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the plaintiff's allegations are admitted except those which are
immaterial, such as specification of dates, and the additional
"fact" of failure to commence suit within x years is set up in
avoidance. That allegations of time are sometimes regarded as
"material" does not seem to have given particular difficulty in
the theory of the nature of the answer. The distinction between
a traverse or a denial on the one hand and confession and avoid-
ance or new matter on the other seems, at times at least, more
largely a matter of rhetoric than a difference in kind and sub-
stance.127 If the plaintiff pleads expressly that his action was
commenced within the period allowed, as he sometimes does in
the statutory actions, and this allegation is specifically denied,
the issue seems as aptly raised as if the answer were by way
of new matter in the approved form. Although issue should not
be taken upon a particular date which might be utterly imma-
terial,228 a specific denial of a plaintiff's allegation of timely suit
may be quite as satisfactory from both issue-raising and notice-
giving standpoints as allegations by way of new matter.12 Of
course the denial form may encounter additional difficulty if the
plaintiff wishes to reply avoiding the effect of the limitation by
showing himself to be within some exception. 3 0 For this reason,
ward, 11 Cush. 48 (Mass. 1853) ; Whitworth v. Pelton, 81 Mich. 98, 45 N.
W. 500 (1890); Walker v. Laney, supra note 116; SHIPAAN, COMm0N LAW
PLuADING (Ballantine's ed. 1923) 348p 350. But see Krause v. Hardin,
222 S. W..310 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Webber v. Ingersoll, 74 Neb. 393,
104 N. W. 600 (1905). Under the codes it is sometimes spoken of as an
answer by way of new matter. BRYANT, op. cit. supra note 57, at 247;
Bell v. Yates, supra note 116; Devoe v. Lutz, 133 App. Div. 356, 117 N. Y.
Supp. 339 (2d Dept. 1909).
127 Atkinson, op. cit. supra note 9, at 169-171.
128 One is seldom required to prove a date exactly as alleged. (1926) 35
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 487.
129 Would not a specific denial of the plaintiff's allegation that the action
had been commenced within the time allowed by law be as satisfactory
as an answer which claimed the benefit of half a dozen different limitation
provisions? Of course it would seldom be possible to permit a denial to
raise the point as there is not ordinarily any allegation of timely suit in
the declaration or complaint. See Central Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. &
P. Ry., suprd note 27; Herold v. Fisk, 16 Ky. L. R. 63 (Super. Ct. 1894).
130 Viz., because of the technical rule that the parties are at issue upon
a denial, there being no opportunity for further pleading thereafter. Ordi-
narily at common law a plaintiff would bring himself within exceptions in
his replication, this being by way of confession and avoidance. Failure
to allege an exception in the reply has been held to prevent the plaintiff
from urging the exception. Reed v. Barnes, 113 Neb. 414, 203 N. W. 567
(1925); Smith v. Cox's Committee, 156 Ky. 118, 160 S. W. 786 (1913);
Amsler v. Cavitt, 271 S. W. 139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). The plaintiff may
(and indeed should in jurisdictions permitting the statute of limitations to
be raised by demurrer) anticipate the defense by alleging his case to be
within some exception. In such case it hould not be necessary for the
plaintiff to file a reply. Larsen v. Duke, supra note 4.
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the answer might be subject to a motion or even a demurrer but
if allowed to stand should certainly permit the defendant to in-
sist upon the point at the trial. The defendant has clearly given
sufficient notice of his intention to rely upon the time limitation.
When the dates alleged in the declaration or complaint show
a timely action, there has been some difficulty as to how the de-
fense should be pleaded. In this situation, some cases hold that
the defendant cannot plead the statute of limitations without
denying the dates set up in the complaint.31 These decisions
seem to go upon the ground that the orthodox form of the plea
of the statute of limitations, being one of confession and avoid-
ance, admitted every part of the plaintiff's declaration or com-
plaint including the dates of accrual of the cause of action. The
strict common law view would consider the time allegations
to be "immaterial" and hence not confessed. This quibble re-
sults from an attempt to force the plea or answer to fit the
mechanics of confession and avoidance since it could not be con-
sidered to be a traverse or denial. The venerable master, Logic,
must be kept alive -by artificial respiration, if necessary. The
orthodox form of the plea of the statute of limitations seems as
sensible here as elsewhere and entirely sufficient from the notice-
giving standpoint. An early New Jersey case 1:2 permitted a
plaintiff who had declared upon a slander uttered one year pre-
vious to prove an act of defamation fifteen years before and
denied the defendant the benefit of the statute of limitations be-
cause it had not been pleaded. Is the only safe practice to plead
the statute in every case? The solution of such a situation
would seem to be to permit the defendant, who has been misled
by the dates in the declaration, to set up the defense by amend-
ment at the trial.133 It is quite unnecessary to prevent the plain-
tiff from proving a barred action after he has alleged dates
showing that it is not barred, and defendant has not pleaded the
statute. 1: Possibly the latter may wish to waive the benefit of
the statute of limitations and he should not be prevented from
so doing.
It has been held that when the bar of the statute of limitations
13, Gray Lithograph Co. v. American Watchman's Time Detector Co., 44
Mlise. 206, 88 N. Y. Supp. 857 (Sup. Ct. 1904); Devoe v. Lutz, spr7a
note 126; Union Ferry Co. v. Fairchild, 106 Misc. 324, 17G N. Y. Supp. 231
(Sup. Ct. 1919); see Lyon v. Bertram, supra note 114; Alexander v. Bryan,
supra note 114. Contra: Elk Garden Big Vein Coal Co. v. Gerstell, 95
W. Va. 471, 121 S. E. 569 (1924); see, generally, szpra notes 114, 110. All
this difficulty comes about from an attempt to force the plea or answer to
fit the mechanics of confession and avoidance. The common law view' seems
more sensible in result and entirely sufficient from the notice standpoint.
"32Brand v. Longstreet, s2pra note 17.
"33Brickett v. Davis, supra note 94.
234 But see Hill v. New Haven, su pra note 17.
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appears on the face of the complaint, it should be raised by de-
murrer or is deemed waived and cannot be asserted by answer.'
But in states which permit the demurrer to raise the point, an
answer will usually be a sufficient means of making the objec-
tion, although the complaint is demurrable on that account.,8"
It might be plausible to hold that the defense should be dis-
favored to the extent that it must be asserted at the earliest
opportunity or is deemed waived. At common law, certain de-
fenses - pleas to the jurisdiction and in abatement - were dis-
approved to the extent that they must be pleaded before matters
in bar.137 However, the plea of limitations was considered to be
in bar and in this respect was in as good favor as any defense
which went to the merits. Under the present New York proce-
dure, the defendant may raise the defense by answer, though he
could have asserted it upon preliminary motion.188 As a whole,
we seem to be unwilling to require that the defendant assert the
defense at the first possible point and in the most expeditious
manner; we deem it sufficient if the defenses be raised in any
approved manner at the pleading stage.
While the courts often declare 1 9 that they do not disfavor the
defense of the statute of limitations, they clearly do so to some
extent. This is probably due in some measure to the prejudice
against those who tacitly admit a once existing duty and de-
fend on the ground that the duty has been extinguished by lapse
of time. This-feeling cannot be overridden entirely by the felt
and declared necessity of quieting stale claims. While the courts
are bound by legislative provisions and have even imposed time
limitation devices of their own manufacture,1 40 they have the
opportunity to give vent to their prejudice in decisions on proce-
dural and other matters. Prejudice may well account for the
prevailing view upon the matter of burden of proof 14l and for
certain holdings 142 of procedural character. It is extremely dif-
.35 Spaur v. McBee, 19 Or. 76, 23 Pac. 818 (1890); see Ausplund v.
;Etna Indemnity Co., 47 Or. 10, 81 Pac. 577 (1905).
"S0 Highstone v. Franks, supra note 79; California Safe Deposit Co. v.
Sierra Valleys Ry., supra note 57; see Yot v. Irwin, supra note 57.
137 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 373.
138 See cases cited supra at the end of note 82.
139 E.g., Cullen v. Western Mortgage & Title Co., 47 Mont. 513, 134 Pac.
302 (1913); Wheeler v. Castor, 11 N. D. 347, 92 N. W. 381 (1902);
Whereatt v. Worth, 108 Wis. 291, 84 N. W. 441 (1900).
240 The doctrine of laches, the presumption of payment, the presumption
of grant, and the ancient limitations in the real actions and possessory
assizes are examples of this.
141 See supra notes 9, 10.
142 There are several ways by which the courts might indicate their
feeling of disapprobation of the defense of limitations in their procedural
decisions.
(1) By insisting upon a particular time and device by which the mat-
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ficult if not impossible to present specific data as to the extent
which this feeling has played in the decisions, but it is possible
and indeed probable that the influence has been considerable.
In addition to this factor, there are certain traits of the de-
fense of the statute of limitations which may account for its
apparent disfavor. While it would be possible to take the po-
sition that the bar is of such vital interest to society that the
court will apply it of its own motion, this view has not pre-
vailed.143 A defendant may believe that his case is not harmed
by passage of time and rely on some other defense, waiving the
matter of time limitation. Once this position of non-assertion
of the statute has been taken, there is much reason in refusing
the defendant the advantage of the defense after he has con-
sumed the time of the opponent and the court by the litigation
of other matters.1 44  Moreover, the defense is one which almost
always 145 acts as an absolute bar to any recovery and not merely
in mitigation of damages.
In addition, a defendant seldom fails to plead the statute of
limitations because of ignorance or mistake concerning the facts
in the case -usually, it is an avoidable oversight on his part.
For these reasons it seems undesirable to permit the defense
to be raised by amendment at a late stage.145 The courts have
been somewhat more strict with reference to amendments set-
ting up the statute of limitations than in case of most other
ter might be raised. See text supra at notes 135-138. (2) By requiring a
particular form of words by which the matter might be raised. See mcpia
notes 114-119. This method of disfavoring the defenses is purely formal
and should not appeal to us today. (3) By holdings in which the defense
when not pleaded is not considered for the purpose of granting motions
for nonsuit, directed verdict, demurrer to evidence and in instructing the
jury. See infr notes 155-158. (4) By the policy toward amendments.
See infra notes 147-154; also Wise v. Outtrim, 139 Iowa, 192, 117 N. W.
264 (1908); Dudley v. Stiles, 32 Wis. 371 (1873).
143See particularly Murphy v. Murphy, supra note 11. There are mat-
ters such as the defense of illegality of contract which the court will
notice, though not pleaded. Keown v. Verlin, 253 Mass. 374, 149 N. E.
115 (1925); 0scanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261 (1880).
144 See Forrest v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 261 Pa. 383, 39, 104
Atl. 663, 664 (1918) for similar reasoning with regard to laches in the
prosecution of an action.
145 See Thompson v. Halbert and Slocum v. Riley, supra note 94 for
cases where the statute was involved in such a way as to mitigate damages
only. Such situations are not common.
:46 Sometimes the courts have tried to balance the unfairness to the
plaintiff by imposing costs in permitting the amendment. Stokes v. Mur-
ray, 99 S. C. 221, 83 S. E. 33 (1914); Smith v. Dragert, 65 Wis. 507, 27
N. W. 317 (1886) ; see Morgan v. Bishop, 61 Wis. 407, 21 N. W. 203 (1884).
But this gives only the slight pittance of taxable costs, which are entirely
inadequate to compensate the opponent. The matter could be determined
satisfactorily by the imposition of costs under the English practice where
substantial and even actual costs are readily granted.
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defenses.147  While they have been fairly liberal if the amend-
ment is prayed for considerably before trial, 48 there is a dif-
ferent attitude shortly before, 49 at or after 160 trial. Of course
if the defendant has been misled by the plaintiff's allegation of
dates,' 15 or if both parties have tried the case as if the statute
were pleaded,152 or if the statute is defectively set forth,U' and
possibly under other circumstances," the amendment should be
allowed even at a late stage.
The defense of the statute of limitations is somewhat peculiar
in that the factual data necessary for its determination are al-
most inevitably injected into the case, although the statute is
not pleaded or consciously raised at the trial. The dates of the
transactions are almost certain to be specified by the witnesses
and the date of commencement of the action regularly appears
in the court records. No further facts are ordinarily necessary
to decide the matter provided of course it is open without be-
ing asserted in the pleadings. With regard to most other mat-
ters of defense such as payment, self-defense, failure of consid-
eration, etc., the data do not so inevitably and unconsciously
creep into the case. Objections to the proof of these matters on
the ground of failure to plead them can be easily made and sus-
147 See Cullen v. Western Mortgage & Title Co., Supra note 139;
also supra note 146, and infras notes 148-150.
148 See People v. Honey Lake Valley Irrigation District, 246 Pac. 819
(Calif. App. 1926); Roche v. Spokane County, 22 Wash. 121, 60 Pac. 59
(1900); Hardin v. Greene, 164 N. C. 99, 80 S. E. 413 (1913). See also
Maddocks v. Holmes, 1 Bos. & Pul. 228 (C. P. 1798).
149 Generally, the trial court's discretion in refusing the amendment at
this stage is sustained. Rudd v. Byrnes, 156 Calif. 636, 105 Pac. 957
(1909); Shank v. Woodworth, 111 Mich. 642, 70 N. W. 140 (1897); St.
Paul v. Bielenberg, 164 Minn. 72, 204 N. W. 544 (1925) ; Cullen v. Western
Mort. & Title Co., supra note 139; DeHihns v. Free, 70 S. C. 344, 49 S. E.
841 (1904). See Whereatt v. Worth, supra note 139.
150 San Joaquin Valley Bank v. Dodge, 125 Calif. 77, 57 Pac. 687 (1899);
Baxter v. Hamilton, 20 Mont. 327, 51 Pac. 265 (1897); MceNider v. Sirrine,
84 Iowa, 58, 50 N. W. 200 (1891); Dreger v. Tarrant, 165 Wis. 414, 162
N. W. 481 (1917); see Bay View Brewing Co. v. Grubb, 31 Wash. 34, 71
Pac. 553 (1903). But see Orton v. Noonan, supra note 101, indicating that
it was better to allow an amendment at any stage than to permit the
plaintiff to peifect his tax title. See also Trower v. San Francisco, 157
Calif. 762, 109 Pac. 617 (1910) (amendment allowed).
15x1 See text supra at notes 133-134; Gottschall v. Melsing and Tazewell v.
Whittle, supra note 94.
1525 Cunliff v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 42 Hun, 654 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1886).
153 St. Paul Title & Trust Co. v. Stensgaard, 162 Calif. 178, 121 Pac.
731 (1912); Buffalo v. Erie County, 88 Misc. 591, 151 N. Y. Supp. 409
(Sup. Ct. 1915); aff'd 171 App. Div. 973, 156 N. Y. Supp. 73 (4th Dept.
1915), 220 N. Y. 620, 115 N. E. 1036 (1917).
'54 People v. Raquette Falls Land Co., 93 Misc. 582, 158 N. Y. Supp.
467 (Sup. Ct. 1916) ; Jones v. Burkitt, 150 S. W. 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912);
Morton v. Bartning, 68 Calif. 306, 9 Pac. 146 (1885).
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tained. But even if the plaintiff, because of the defendant's omis-
sion to plead the statute of limitations, objected to the proof
of a date which tended to show the action was barred, the dates
would be admissible for the purposes of identification of the
transactions and convenience in the narration of the events.
Usually the plaintiff would not think of objecting to proof of
the dates, which would likely appear from the testimony of his
own witnesses. In other words, the data concerning the defense
of the statute of limitations is generally in the case whether the
matter is being litigated or not. This is less apt to occur with
reference to most other defenses. With them there is probably
a tendency to hold that the matters can be considered for the
purposes of demurrer to the evidence and motions for nonsuit or
directed verdict I-r, and of instr uctions to the jury,11 even if not
pleaded. But seldom157 would a court consider the incidental
evidence as to date as grounds for granting motions at the trial
or giving instructions with reference to the statute of limitations
when the matter has not been pleaded.
While the data concerning the defense of the statute of limita-
tions are almost always present at the close of the trial, as a
matter of legal theory the defense stands isolated from most
other matters commonly litigated. Many defenses are closely
related to elements of the plaintiff's affirmative case or to other
defenses which may have been properly pleaded, c. g., contrib-
utory negligence to the defendant's negligence and proximate
cause, self-defense to the defendant's acts and various privileges
of either party and even payment to a present indebtedness of
the defendant. With respect to these and similar matters there
is much chance that the parties will completely litigate an aspect
of the case which is not raised directly by the pleadings. While
it is possible that they may do so in the ease of the defense of
time limitations, still the break is sharper and hence less apt to
155 Keown v. Verlin, s.pra note 149; M Iellon v. Great Northern Ry., 116
Minn. 449, 134 N. W. 116 (1912); Boesel v. Wells Fargo & Co., 200 Mo.
463, 169 S. W. 110 (1914) ; Jones v. Sunshine Grocery & Market, 230 S. W.
614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Smith v. Ogden & N. W. R., 33 Utah, 129, 93
Pac. 185 (1907).
156 Central R. R. v. Attaway, 90 Ga. 656, 16 S. E. 956 (1893); Hanson
v. Kline, 136 Iowa, 101, 113 N. W. 504 (1907); Johnson v. Caughren, 55
Wash. 125, 104 Pac. 170 (1909) ; Brusie v. Peck Bros. & Co., 135 N. Y. 622,
32 N. E. 76 (1892); see Kronenberg v. Whale, 153 N. E. 302, 307 (Ohio
App. 1926).
157 On the theory that the court could have permitted the point to have
been asserted by amendment during the trial, it has been held that a de-
murrer to the evidence is properly sustained on the ground that the statute
of limitations had run. Atwood Mercantile Co. v. Rooney, mipa note 94;
see In re Glover-McConnell (D. C. Ga. 1925) 9 Fed. (2d) 683, 685. It is
very questionable whether a court should grant an amendment at this
stage. Hence the argument seems specious. See supra note 150.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
occur. Unless there is a conscious entrance into the subject, it
would seem unfair to the plaintiff to permit the defendant to
take advantage of the statute of limitations. Otherwise a plain-
tiff will not be given a fair chance to insist upon accurate deter-
mination of dates or to show the existence of some possible ex-
ception which would prevent the statute of limitations from
running. There seem to be adequate reasons aside from a mere
prejudice against the subject matter of the defense of the statute
of limitations why the courts should require that the matter be
raised in the pleading stage. In fact the only question in the
writer's mind is whether we should not go further and insist
that in the absence of special circumstances the defense should
be raised in the earliest possible stage and in the most expedi-
tious manner. This of course would result in holding that, when-
ever possible, the defendant should raise the point by demurrer
or by motion and be deemed to have waived the objection if he
does not.
CONCLUSION
The following is a brief summary of the writer's position. It
is by no means the position taken in the majority of jurisdic-
tions.
1. The New York method of asserting the bar of the statute
of limitations by motion at a preliminary stage of the action is
the most efficient method yet to appear.
2. As a first alternative to the above the demurrer, prefer-
ably the special demurrer, should be permitted to raise the
point in all possible cases. To this end the plaintiff should be
obliged to bring himself within any exception upon which he
relies, either in the original or amended complaint.
3. In the cases in which the foregoing devices cannot be used
and generally in the jurisdictions which refuse to use them, the
bar of the statute should be raised specially in the plea or an-
swer.
4. A defendant should not be permitted to raise the defense
of limitation of time under the general issue or general denial.
This would seem desirable even in those cases in which he re-
lies upon title by adverse possession or a special limitation of a
statutory action. All time limitations should have as far as
possible the same procedural treatment.
5. It seems sound to consider that the defense is waived un-
less presented by one of the first three above alternative means.
Amendments asserting the defense at a late stage of the pro-
ceeding should be allowed only under special circumstances.
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